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On the Optimality of Secret Key Agreement
via Omniscience
Chung Chan, Manuj Mukherjee, Navin Kashyap and Qiaoqiao Zhou
Abstract—For the multiterminal secret key agreement problem
under a private source model, it is known that the maximum
key rate, i.e., the secrecy capacity, can be achieved through
communication for omniscience, but the omniscience strategy
can be strictly suboptimal in terms of minimizing the public
discussion rate. While a single-letter characterization is not
known for the minimum discussion rate needed for achieving
the secrecy capacity, we derive single-letter lower and upper
bounds that yield some simple conditions for omniscience to be
discussion-rate optimal. These conditions turn out to be enough to
deduce the optimality of omniscience for a large class of sources
including the hypergraphical sources. Through conjectures and
examples, we explore other source models to which our methods
do not easily extend.
Index Terms—secret key agreement, omniscience, multivariate
mutual information, Wyner common information, Ga´cs-Ko¨rner
common information.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the secret key agreement problem of [1], pos-
sibly with trusted and untrusted helpers, as well as silent users
as in [2]. Two or more users want to agree on a secret key after
observing some discrete memoryless correlated private sources
that take values from finite alphabet sets. The users are allowed
to discuss (possibly interactively) with other users publicly
over a noiseless authenticated broadcast channel. After the
discussion, each active user (who is not a helper) attempts to
compute a common secret key that is asymptotically uniformly
random and independent of the public discussion as well as
the private sources of the untrusted helpers. The maximum
achievable key rate is called the secrecy capacity CS, and
the minimum public discussion rate required to achieve the
capacity is called the communication complexity RS. While
CS was characterized in [1], a single-letter characterization
for RS remains open, and is the main focus of this work.
For the general source model with possibly trusted helpers,
it was shown in [1] that RS can be upper bounded by
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the smallest rate RCO of communication for omniscience
(CO), the state where every active user can asymptotically
recover the entire private source. More precisely, the proposed
capacity-achieving scheme is through omniscience, i.e., by
having users communicate in public until every user recovers
the entire private source and then extract a common secret key
as a function of the recovered source that is asymptotically
independent of the public discussion. While this omniscience
strategy was shown to be capacity-achieving, it was also
pointed out in [1] to be suboptimal in the sense that strict
inequality RS < RCO is possible.
For the general source model with two users but no helpers,
there is a multi-letter characterization of RS in [3], and an
example was also given where non-interactive discussion, i.e.,
the usual independent source coding scheme over a source
network [4], was shown to be suboptimal. When the number of
discussion rounds is bounded, their characterization becomes
a single-letter expression. [5] extended the framework of [3] to
the multiterminal case and obtained a lower bound of RS. The
lower bound is a multi-letter even when the number of rounds
is bounded. A special hypergraphical private source model [6]
was also considered in [7] in the multi-user case but without
helpers, and RS was characterized when the discussion is non-
asymptotic and restricted to be linear functions over a finite
field. However, the expression was NP-hard to compute, and it
was shown to be a loose upper bound for RS in the asymptotic
model [7].
While a single-letter characterization remains unknown even
for the two-user case, simpler questions about the communi-
cation complexity may be asked. In the no-helper case, [8]
considered the refined condition of omnivocality, which is the
scenario when every user must discuss at strictly positive rate
to achieve the secrecy capacity. The result was further refined
by [9] to a set of vocality conditions that describes whether
a particular user needs to discuss at strictly positive rate to
achieve the capacity. These conditions were conjectured to be
necessary and sufficient, but the conjectures turn out to be easy
to resolve (see [10–12]) using
1) the characterization of the secrecy capacity in [2] in the
no-helper case under the additional vocality constraints
that a given proper subset of the users, called the silent
users, are not allowed to discuss, and
2) the properties of the multivariate mutual information
(MMI) [10] that was shown in [6, 13] to be equal to
the secrecy capacity in the no-helper case.
In this work, we consider a different question that turns out
to be easier to address than the problem of characterizing RS:
When is omniscience optimal for achieving secrecy capacity,
2i.e., when is RS = RCO? This question was raised in
[14] in the no-helper case, and a sufficient condition for the
optimality of omniscience was given in the special case of the
pairwise independent network (PIN) model defined in [15, 16].
The sufficient condition was later shown to be necessary
in [5]. However, the result does not apply to more general
source models beyond PIN, such as the hypergraphical model.
Moreover, the problem formulation in [5] precludes additional
randomization in the public discussion; it was conjectured (but
not proved) there that randomization does not affect RS. In this
work, we overcome the above weaknesses and the following
are the contributions:
1) Derive single-letter lower and upper bounds for a general
source model possibly with helpers and silent users, and
with private randomization allowed.
2) Obtain easily computable sufficient as well as necessary
conditions for the optimality of omniscience.
3) Discover more scenarios beyond PIN for which RS can
be characterized by RCO.
4) Give concrete examples where the sufficient/necessary
conditions can fail to be necessary/sufficient respectively,
which may inspire further improvement on the bounds.
The results in the no-helper case will be stated more mean-
ingfully using the MMI in [10] that extends Shannon’s mutual
information to the multivariate case. RS can be viewed as a
measure of discord of the mutual information, and the public
discussion viewed as an irreversible process of making the
mutual information among the users less and less discordant
until a consensus is achieved wherein the mutual information
among the users is consolidated as a common secret key
without further discussion.
The paper is organized as follows:
• The main ideas of the paper are motivated in Section II
with some simple examples. Some background knowl-
edge in secret key agreement is assumed.
• Section III formulates the problem by introducing 1) the
secret key agreement problem with different types of
users in Section III-A, and 2) the capacity-achieving
omniscience strategy in Section III-B.
• For ease of understanding, the main results are introduced
in two stages. The basic scenario with no helpers or
silent users is first tackled in Section IV, where the
fundamental proof techniques can be conveyed without
much notational complexity.
• In the second stage, the proof techniques are extended to
the general scenarios with helpers and silent users. We
first derive single-letter upper bounds on the communi-
cation complexity in Section V, which follows directly
from the achievability result of the omniscience strategy
in Section V-A or indirectly by a change of scenario in
Section V-B.
• Single-letter lower bounds for the general scenario are
derived in Section VI. We extend the proof techniques
in an information-theoretically meaningful manner, by
introducing in Section VI-A some properties of a frac-
tional partition information measure useful for proving
converse results. The general lower bound is then derived
in Section VI-B using the converse proof techniques. The
tightness of the bound is investigated in Section VI-C,
VI-D, VI-E and VI-F, where the general lower bound
is specialized and strengthened to different forms under
different scenarios and for the hypergraphical source
model.
• Section VII explain the challenges that remain. The
current techniques was shown to be limited for a non-
hypergraphical source in Section VII-A, resolving the
conjecture in [17]. Potential improvements of the results
are conjectured and illustrated in Section VII-B.
Proofs of the results are included in the appendices.
II. MOTIVATION
The purpose of this section is to present some simple
motivating examples. It is assumed that the reader is familiar
with the basic problem of multiterminal secret key agreement,
as introduced in [1].
We first introduce the idea of secret key agreement infor-
mally by the following example where omniscience is strictly
suboptimal RS < RCO.
Example 2.1 Let X0,X1 and J be uniformly random and
independent bits. Suppose users 1 and 2 observe the private
sources
Z1 := (X0,X1) and
Z2 := (XJ, J)
respectively, where XJ is equal to X0 if J = 0, and equal to X1
otherwise. A secret key agreement scheme with block length
n = 1 is to have
F := F2 = J and
K := XJ,
i.e., have user 2 reveal J in public so that both users can
compute and use XJ as the secret key, which can be shown
to be independent of F as desired. This is capacity-achieving
because the secrecy capacity in the two-user case is the mutual
information [1]
CS = I(Z1 ∧ Z2) = 1
and so the communication complexity RS is at most H(J) =
1. Note that omniscience has not been attained because
H(Z1|Z2) > 0 (and so user 2 cannot recover Z1−J unless
user 1 also communicates). More precisely, from [1], the
minimum rate of communication for omniscience is
RCO = H(Z1|Z2) +H(Z2|Z1) = 2 > 1 ≥ RS.
In particular, to achieve omniscience, user 1 needs to discuss
at rate at least H(Z1|Z2) while user 2 needs to discuss at rate
at least H(Z2|Z1), hence the RCO formula above. ✷
RS is difficult to compute even for the above example.
Nevertheless, there is a simple condition for omniscience to
be optimal in the general two-user case, which is obvious
from [3, 18, 19]:
3Proposition 2.1 For the two-user case, RS = RCO iff RCO =
0, i.e., H(Z1|Z2) = H(Z2|Z1) = 0 where Zi is the private
source observed by user i ∈ {1, 2}. ✷
PROOF The “if” case is trivial and follows from the bound
RS ≤ RCO. To prove the “only if” case, note that the
capacity-achieving scheme of [18, 19] has a discussion rate of
min{H(Z1|Z2), H(Z2|Z1)} ∈ [RS, RCO]. RS = RCO implies
that the minimum is RCO = H(Z1|Z2)+H(Z2|Z1) [1], which
happens iff H(Z1|Z2) = H(Z2|Z1) = 0, or equivalently,
RCO = 0. 
One of our goals is to extend the above condition to the mul-
titerminal case to discover new scenarios where omniscience
is optimal:
Example 2.2 Suppose user 3 observes the private source
Z3 := Z1 ⊕ Z2, (2.2)
which is the XOR of two uniformly random and independent
bits Z1 and Z2 observed by users 1 and 2 respectively. In the
no-helper case, a secret key agreement scheme is to have each
user i ∈ {1, 2, 3} observe n = 2 i.i.d. samples, Zi1 and Zi2,
of its private source, and then choose
F := (F1,F2,F3) = (Z11 ⊕ Z12,Z22,Z31) and
K := Z11.
It can be shown that K is independent of (F1,F2,F3) and
therefore secure. User 1 can recover the key trivially, while
users 2 and 3 can recover it from their observations and the
public discussion by computing respectively
F3 ⊕ Z21 = K and
F1 ⊕ F2 ⊕ Z32 = K
by (2.2). This is capacity-achieving because the secrecy ca-
pacity is upper bounded by [1, (26)] as
CS ≤
1
2
[
3∑
i=1
H(Zi)−H(Z1,Z2,Z3)
]
=
1
2
,
which is achieved by the current scheme. Omniscience is also
attained because H(K,F) = 4, which is the randomness of
the entire source sequence (Zn1 ,Z
n
2 ,Z
n
3 ). Since every user can
observe F and recover K, they can also recover the entire
source sequence. ✷
The above example belongs to a more general finite linear
source model [13] instead of the PIN or hypergraphical source
model considered in the existing works of [5, 20]. Our result
will imply RS = RCO for this example.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
While the no-helper case provides much intuition into the
problem of communication complexity, we will consider the
more general scenario with helpers and silent users, which
unveils new challenges and inspires new techniques. More
precisely, we will extend the secret key agreement protocol
of [1] without silent users and that of [2] without helpers to
study the problem of communication complexity in the general
case with both helpers and silent users. It will be seen that the
secret key agreement scheme via omniscience from [1] needs
to be modified, in particular, to minimize the discussion of the
untrusted users, and to incorporate silent users as in [2].
A. Communication Complexity
The following specifies all the user sets involved in the
secret key agreement problem:
User sets
V : The ordered finite set of all users, where |V | ≥ 2. Unless
stated otherwise, we assume V = [|V |] where
[m] := {1, . . . ,m} (3.1)
for any positive integer m ≥ 2.
A ⊆ V : The subset of |A| ≥ 2 users, called the active
users (who want to share a common secret key among
themselves). V \A is called the set of helpers (who help
the active users share the secret key).
D ⊆ V \A: The subset of untrusted helpers (whose observa-
tions are wiretapped). The subset1V \ A \D consists of
the trusted helpers.
S ⊆ A ∪D: The subset of silent users (who cannot speak in
public). V \ S consists of the vocal users. Without loss
of generality, we assume V \S := [|V \S|] unless stated
otherwise.
The users have access to a private (discrete memoryless
multiple) source denoted by the random vector
ZV := (Zi | i ∈ V ) ∼ PZV taking values from
ZV :=
∏
i∈V
Zi,
(3.2a)
(3.2b)
which is assumed to be finite. Note that, for notational
convenience, we use capital letter in sans serif font for random
variables and the same capital letter in the usual math italic
font for the alphabet sets. PZV denotes the joint distribution
of Zi’s.
The vector (A,S,D, V,ZV ) of user sets and private source
is called a scenario. Given a scenario, the vocal users discuss
in public until the active users can recover a secret key of
their choice that is secured against a wiretapper who can listen
to the public discussion and wiretap the private source of the
untrusted users. The protocol can be divided into the following
phases for ease of exposition:
Secret key agreement protocol
Private observation: Each user i ∈ V observes an i.i.d.
sequence
Z
n
i := (Zit | t ∈ [n]) = (Zi1, . . . ,Zin)
of its private source Zi for some block length n.
1For sets E,F,G, we will use the notation E \ F \ G to denote the set
difference (E \ F ) \G.
4Private randomization: Each user i ∈ V \D \ S generates
a random variable Ui independent of the private source, i.e.,
H(UV \D\S |ZnV ) =
∑
i∈V \D\S
H(Ui). (3.3)
(We will show in Proposition 3.1 that the silent and untrusted
users need not randomize for the problem of interest.) For
convenience, we let
Z˜i :=
{
(Ui,Z
n
i ) i ∈ V \D \ S
Zni i ∈ S ∪D (otherwise)
(3.4)
be the entire private observation of user i ∈ V .
Public discussion: Using a public authenticated noiseless
channel, the vocal users broadcast some messages in a round-
robin fashion interactively for a finite number of rounds.
More precisely, at times t = 1, . . . , r for some positive
integer r, the vocal user i ∈ V \ S broadcasts to everyone a
function of its accumulated observations, denoted as
Fit := fit(Z˜i, F˜it) where (3.5)
F˜it := (F[i−1] t,F
t−1
V \S), (3.6a)
which includes the previous messages F[i−1] t := (Fjt | j <
i) broadcast in the same round and the messages Ft−1V \S :=
(FV \S τ | τ < t) = (Fiτ | i ∈ V \ S, τ < t) broadcast
in previous rounds. Note that, unless otherwise stated, we
assumed without loss of generality that the discussion in each
round is in the ascending order of i ∈ V and that [i − 1] ⊆
V \ S. We also use
Fi := (Fit | t ∈ [r]) and
F := (Fi | i ∈ V \ S)
(3.6b)
(3.6c)
to denote, respectively, the vector of all messages from
user i ∈ V \ S and all vocal users.
Key generation: Each user i ∈ A is required to recover a
common secret key from his accumulated observations in the
sense that
lim
n→∞
Pr
(
∃i ∈ A,K 6= θi(Z˜i,F)
)
= 0 (3.7)
for a random variable K, called the secret key, and some
function θi that recovers the key from the entire observation
of user i ∈ A. The secret key K must also be nearly uniformly
random and independent of the wiretapper’s observations
(F, Z˜D), i.e.,
lim
n→∞
1
n
[
log |K| −H(K|F, Z˜D)
]
= 0, (3.8)
where K denotes the finite alphabet set of possible key
values.
The secrecy capacity is defined as
CS := sup lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log |K| (3.9)
where the supremum is taken over all key rates achievable for
the given scenario (A,S,D, V,ZV ) but with any sequence (in
n) of choices of other parameters respecting the constraints on
private randomization (3.3), interactive public discussion (3.5)
as well as recoverability (3.7) and secrecy (3.8) of the secret
key. A CS-achieving scheme corresponds to a sequence of
choices with achievable key rate equal to the capacity. If the
supremum in (3.9) and the constraints (3.7) and (3.8) can be
achieved for a finite n, the capacity is said to be achievable
non-asymptotically.
The communication complexity is the minimum public
discussion rate required to achieve the secrecy capacity, i.e.,
RS := inf lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|F |, (3.10)
where F denotes the finite alphabet set of possible values of
F and the infimum is taken over all the discussion rates of
CS-achieving schemes.
Remark 3.1 Our problem formulation covers [1, 2] as special
cases:
• Without silent active users, i.e., S ⊆ D, our formulation
reduces to that in [1];
• Without trusted helpers, i.e., A = V \D, but at least one
vocal active user A \ S 6= ∅, we obtain the formulation
in [2].
The wiretapper’s side information in [1, 2] can be covered
equivalently as the private source Zi of a silent untrusted user
i ∈ S ∩D. ✷
We will focus on the case without silent untrusted users,
i.e., S ∩D = ∅, because with silent untrusted users, even the
secrecy capacity is largely unknown, let alone the communi-
cation complexity. Indeed, our case of interest will be further
restricted to the following for a similar reason:
S ( A with at least one vocal active user.
The secrecy capacity when all active users are silent remains
unknown except in the special case with only two trusted
users [21] or without helpers.2 We also remark that certain
user types need not be considered in the problem formulation.
Remark 3.2 Without loss of optimality, one need not consider
the presence of the following users:
• Untrusted active users, i.e., A 6⊆ V \ D: The secrecy
capacity is zero trivially because the recoverability con-
dition (3.7) for such users means that the wiretapper
can also recover the key, hence violating the secrecy
condition (3.8).
• Silent trusted helpers, i.e., S 6⊆ A ∪ D: Their presence
affect neither the recoverability condition (3.7) (by being
silent) nor the secrecy condition 3.8 (by being trusted).
✷
2In the case when all users are active and silent, i.e., V = A = S, it is
straightforward to show that CS = JGK(ZV ) := max{H(U) | H(U|Zi) =
0,∀i ∈ A}, which is the multivariate extension of Ga´cs-Ko¨rner common
information [22]. We would like to point out here that there is a subtle issue
with our preliminary work in [17], in which it was claimed but not proved
that the Ga´cs-Ko¨rner common information is equal to the secrecy capacity
at zero rate of public discussion. We are not able to extend the converse
result [22] from no discussion to sub-linear amount (in n) of discussion.
Hence, in [17], CS > JGK(ZV ) can only be conjectured as a sufficient
condition for RS > 0.
5It was conjectured in [5] that private randomization does not
reduce RS in the case when all users are vocal and active. In
the general case with helpers and silent users, the conjecture
also appears very plausible, with no apparent counter-example
that suggests otherwise. Indeed, as the following result shows,
private randomization by any silent or untrusted user is not
necessary, and so our formulation precluded them without loss
of optimality.
Proposition 3.1 Allowing private randomization by any silent
or untrusted user j ∈ S ∪D, i.e., modifying (3.4) with
Z˜j = (Uj ,Z
n
j ) where I(Uj ∧ Z˜V \{j},Znj ) = 0 (3.11)
neither increases CS nor decreases RS. ✷
PROOF See Appendix A. 
B. Optimality of Omniscience
Next, we take a step back to formulate the easier problem of
the optimality of a general class of CS-achieving strategies (in
terms of minimizing the public discussion rate, i.e., achieving
RS). In both the case [1] (with helpers but no active users)
and the case [2] (with active users but no helpers), it can be
seen that the proposedCS-achieving schemes require the active
users to recover the private sources of the vocal users after
public discussion. We will extend this idea to the following
CS-achieving scheme for the general case of interest described
with helpers and silent users:
Definition 3.1 For S ( A, the omniscience strategy for secret
key agreement requires each vocal user i ∈ V \S to broadcast
in public a function
Fi := fi(Z˜i) = fi(Z
n
i ) (3.12)
of its source such that each active user can first recover the
private sources of the (vocal) untrusted users in the sense that
lim
n→∞
Pr
(
∃i ∈ A,ZnD 6= φi(Z˜i,FD)
)
= 0 (3.13a)
for some function φi’s, and then recover the private sources
of all other vocal users, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
Pr
(∃i ∈ A,
ZnV \D\S 6= ψi(Z˜i,FV \D\S ,ZnD)
)
= 0
(3.13b)
for some function ψi’s. Note that the omniscience strategy
does not require private randomness. Furthermore, a natural
question to ask is whether it is important that ZnD be recovered
before the other private sources are. This will be addressed in
Example 3.1 and the remark preceding it. We also require
the omniscience strategy to minimize the total discussion rate,
denoted by
RCO := inf lim sup
n→∞
1
n
|F |
= inf lim sup
n→∞
1
n
∑
i∈V \S
|Fi|,
(3.14)
the infimum being taken over all functions fi, i ∈ V \ S,
that satisfy (3.12)–(3.13). The two recoverability constraints in
(3.13) will be called the omniscience constraints, to distinguish
them from the recoverability constraint (3.7) for the secret key.
For the omniscience strategy to be CS-achieving, we will also
limit the discussion rates of the untrusted users to satisfy3(
lim
n→∞
1
n
log|Fi|
∣∣∣i ∈ D) ∈ R(ZD) where
R(ZD) := {rD ∈ RD | r(B) ≤ H(ZB), ∀B ⊆ D}.
(3.15)
(3.16)
The secret key is then chosen as a function
K = θ(ZnV \S) (3.17)
of the entire private source of the vocal users at the maximum
rate subject to the secrecy constraint (3.8). (Note that (3.7)
immediately follows from (3.13).) ✷
We will show in Section V that the omniscience strategy
in Definition 3.1 is CS-achieving in the general case of
interest, and that RCO has a single-letter linear-programming
characterization. Therefore,RCO serves as a computable upper
bound on RS. We say that omniscience is optimal for secret
key agreement if the bound is tight, i.e., RS = RCO, in which
case RS has a single-letter characterization given by RCO. Our
goal is to discover general classes of scenarios under which
omniscience is or is not optimal, i.e., the sufficient or necessary
conditions for the optimality of omniscience. In particular,
we will specialize/strengthen the results to the hypergraphical
source model:
Definition 3.2 ([6, Definition 2.4]) ZV is a hypergraphical
source with respect to a hypergraph (V,E, ξ) with edge
function ξ : E → 2V \ {∅} (which maps from an edge label
in E to a non-empty subset of V ) iff
Zi = (Xe | e ∈ E, i ∈ ξ(e)) ∀i ∈ V. (3.18)
for some independent (hyper-)edge variables Xe for e ∈ E
with H(Xe) > 0. ✷
The above source model also covers the PIN model in [15, 16]
as a special case:
Definition 3.3 ([16]) ZV is a PIN iff it is hypergraphical with
respect to a graph (V,E, ξ) with edge function ξ : E → (V2)
(no self-loops). ✷
An example of a hypergraphical source and a PIN is given at
the end of this section (Example 3.1).
We remark that the omniscience strategy above differs from
that in [1] even in the case without silent users:
Remark 3.3 Instead of (3.13a), [1] require the entire source
of the untrusted user to be revealed in public in the sense that
lim
n→∞
Pr (ZnD 6= φ(FD)) = 0, (3.19)
i.e., the source of the untrusted users can be recovered not
only by the active users but also by anyone who gets to listen
to the discussion FD by the untrusted users. As will be shown
by the following example, RCO can be strictly larger with
3Although the proof of Theorem 5.1 relies on (3.15), we conjecture that
(3.15) is not required for the omniscience strategy to be CS-achieving.
6this requirement, resulting in a looser upper bound on RS.
The example also shows that (3.13a) and (3.13b) should not
be combined into the constraint
lim
n→∞
Pr
(
∃i ∈ A,ZnV \S 6= φi(Zni ,F)
)
= 0 (3.20)
because even an optimal discussion F under this constraint
can leak too much information to the wiretapper. Hence
omniscience through (3.20) no longer guarantees achieving
CS. ✷
Example 3.1 Let Xa and Xb be two uniformly random and
independent bits, and
Z1 := Xa
Z2 := (Xa,Xb)
Z3 := Xb
Z4 := (Xa,Xb)
With V = [3], the source ZV = (Z1,Z2,Z3) is a PIN with
vertex set [3], edge set E = {a, b} and the edge function
ξ(e) =
{
{1, 2} e = a
{2, 3} e = b.
With V = [4] instead, the source ZV is not a PIN but a
hypergraphical source with the edge function modified to
ξ(e) =
{
{1, 2, 4} e = a
{2, 3, 4} e = b.
Consider the scenario (A,S,D, V ) = ({2, 4}, ∅, {3}, [4]). It
can be shown that
CS = 1 and RS = RCO = 0,
achieved non-asymptotically with
n = 1, K := Xa and F deterministic.
Hence, omniscience is optimal in this case. Now, if the
recoverability condition (3.19) in [1] were imposed instead
of (3.13a), then RCO ≥ H(Z3) = H(Xb) = 1 > 0 = RS, and
so the omniscience scheme would not be optimal.
Consider the scenario (A,S,D, V ) = ({1, 2, 4}, ∅, {3}, [4])
instead. It can be shown that
CS = 1 and RS = 0,
achieved non-asymptotically with
n = 1, K = Xa and F deterministic.
However, since the active user 1 does not observe Xb directly
from its private source,
RCO ≥ H(ZV |Z1) ≥ H(Xb) = 1,
which is achieved by choosing F := F3 := Xb. It follows that
RS = 0 < 1 = RCO, and so omniscience is not optimal.
Now, if (3.20) were imposed instead of (3.13), then RCO = 1
as before but it could be achieved with F := F2 := Xa ⊕ Xb,
from which user 1 can recover Xb as F ⊕ Z1. However, the
wiretapper can also recover Z1 as F⊕ Z3 by wiretapping the
source of the untrusted user 3. Since the entire source, i.e.,
Xa and Xb, can be recovered by the wiretapper, any secret
key K satisfying (3.17) and (3.8) must have zero rate. In other
words, the current discussion for omniscience, despite being
optimal in achieving RCO, leaks too much information to the
wiretapper. ✷
IV. WITH NO HELPERS OR SILENT USERS
In this section, we will introduce the main ideas through the
basic scenario A = V and S = ∅. Unless stated otherwise,
the basic scenario will be assumed for all the results in this
section.
A. Preliminaries on MMI and Fundamental Partition
CS in the current case is characterized by RCO as:
Proposition 4.1 ([1]) The omniscience strategy achieves
CS = H(ZV )−RCO, (4.1)
and so RS ≤ RCO. ✷
RCO was also characterized in [1] as a linear program using
standard techniques of independent source coding [4]. In fact,
|RCO is easily computable since the expression for RCO in
(3.14) was argued to be solvable in polynomial time4 with
respect to the size of the network [23, 24].
To study the tightness of the RCO upper bound, we will
make use of the following (conditional) multivariate mutual
information (MMI) measure and its properties studied in [10]:
For a finite set U and a random vector (Z′U ,W
′),
I(Z′U |W′) := min
P∈Π′(U)
IP(Z
′
U |W′), with
IP(Z
′
U |W′) := 1|P|−1D
(
PZ′
U
|W′
∥∥∥∏
C∈P
PZ′
C
|W′
∣∣∣PW′)
:= 1|P|−1
[∑
C∈P
H(Z′C |W′)−H(Z′U |W′)
]
,
(4.2a)
(4.2b)
where Π′(U) is the collection of partitions of U into at
least two non-empty disjoint parts, and D(·‖· | ·) is the
conditional Kullback–Leibler divergence. We also define the
unconditional MMI measures I(Z′U ) and IP(Z
′
U ) by dropping
the conditioning on W′ throughout (4.2).
The MMI appeared as an upper bound on the secrecy
capacity in [1, (26)] in the special case without helpers. In
[25], the bound [1, (26)] was shown to be loose in the more
general case with helpers but identified to be tight in the no-
helper case and therefore proposed as a measure of mutual
information among multiple random variables:
Proposition 4.2 ([6, Theorem 1.1]) CS = I(ZV ) in the case
without helpers or silent users. ✷
The proof uses the submodularity [26] of the entropy function
B 7→ H(Z′B|W′) for B ⊆ U (a class of Shannon-type
inequalities [27, 28]) to show that the linear-programming
characterization of CS in [1] is equal to the MMI. A simple
proof using the Dilworth truncation was given in [10]. Like
4This is assuming that the entropy function B 7→ H(ZB) for each B ⊆ V
can be evaluated in polynomial time.
7Shannon’s mutual information, the MMI has various funda-
mental information-theoretic properties including the data pro-
cessing inequality [10] (which will be refined in Lemma 6.1).
Denote the set of all optimal partitions to (4.2a) as
Π
∗(Z′U |W′) := {P ∈ Π′(U) | IP(Z′U |W′) = I(Z′U |W′)}.
(4.3)
The set Π′(U) is endowed with a partial order, denoted by ,
with P  P ′ having the meaning
∀C ∈ P , ∃C′ ∈ P ′ such that C ⊆ C′. (4.4)
In other words, P can be obtained from P ′ by further
partitioning some parts of P ′; we then say that P is finer than
P ′. We will consider the finest partition in Π∗(Z′U |W′), the
existence of which is guaranteed by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 ([10, Lemma 5.1 and Theorem 5.2])
Π
∗(Z′U |W′) forms a lower semi-lattice with respect to the
partial order (4.4). In particular, there is a unique finest
partition in Π∗(Z′U |W′). ✷
The unique finest partition in Π∗(Z′U |W′) is called the fun-
damental partition, and is denoted as P∗(Z′U |W′). Again, the
unconditional versions of these definitions, namely, Π∗(Z′U )
and P∗(Z′U ), are obtained by dropping the conditioning on W′
throughout. The fundamental partition has various meaningful
interpretations in the problems of vocality [8, 9], successive
omniscience [12], data clustering [29, 30] and feature selec-
tion [31].
The condition for the optimality of omniscience in [5, 14]
for the PIN model in Definition 3.3 is expressed in terms of
the fundamental partition.
Proposition 4.4 ([5, Theorem 8, Corollary 23]) For the
PIN model, we have RS = RCO iff P∗(ZV ) = {{i} | i ∈ V },
namely, the partition into singletons. ✷
The result was based on a lower bound on RS in [5] that
extends the result of [3] to the multiterminal setting using the
multi-letter multivariate Wyner common information:
CW := inf lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(L) such that
lim
n→∞
1
n
IP∗(ZV )(Z
n
V |L) = 0
(4.5a)
(4.5b)
where the infimum is for a given ZV . Note that P∗(ZV ) is
used instead of P∗(ZnV |L). Furthermore, [5] required L to be
a function of ZnV , i.e., H(L|ZnV ) = 0.
Proposition 4.5 ([5, Theorem 2]) The communication com-
plexity RNRS with private randomization (3.3) precluded in the
problem formulation is lowered bounded as
RNRS ≥ CW − I(ZV ), (4.6)
which holds also with the additional constraint that
H(L|ZnV ) = 0. ✷
The use of the above lower bound is somewhat limited
by the difficulty in evaluating the multi-letter expression CW
and the problem formulation that precludes randomization.
The derivation of Proposition 4.5 requires quite a bit of
machinery to evaluate CW, and to extend the result to allow
randomization. We will improve the bound (in Theorem 4.1
in Section IV-B) with a single-letter expression, for which we
need the following definition:
Definition 4.1 For a finite set U with size |U | > 1 and
random vector (Z′U ,W
′), the (conditional) partition Wyner
common information of Z′U given W
′ with respect to the
partition P ∈ Π′(U) is
JW,P(Z
′
U |W′) := inf{I(W ∧ Z′U |W′) |
IP (Z
′
U |W,W′) = 0},
(4.7a)
(4.7b)
where the minimum is taken over all possible choices of the
random variableW (or PW|Z′
U
,W′ ). JW(Z
′
i∧Z′j |W′) denotes the
bivariate case U = {i, j} where i 6= j. (The version without
conditioning reduces to the usual Wyner common information
introduced by [32].) ✷
If P is the partition into singletons, and W′ is determinisitic,
then JW,P is the extension in [33] of the Wyner common
information [32] from the bivariate case JW(Zi ∧ Zj), to the
multivariate case. Following the same argument as in [32], the
expression (4.7) is computable with the following bound on
support size:
Proposition 4.6 For the partition Wyner common informa-
tion (4.7), it is admissible to impose
|W | ≤ |Z ′U ||W ′|, (4.8)
and inf can be replaced by min, i.e., the infimum can be
achieved by a choice of W satisfying (4.8) in addition. ✷
PROOF This follows from the same argument as in [32] and
will be proved for the more general setting in Proposition 6.3.
Despite the above result, JW,P is not easy to compute
even for the bivariate case [32]. Fortunately, it has non-trivial
entropic [10] bounds that are easy to compute from the entropy
function of the given random vector:
Proposition 4.7
H(Z′U |W′) ≥ JW,P(Z′U |W′) ≥ JD,P(Z′U |W′) where
JD,P(Z
′
U |W′) := H(Z′U |W′)−
∑
C∈P
H(Z′C |Z′U\C ,W′),
(4.9)
(4.10)
which will be called the partition dual total correlation. ✷
PROOF Since W = Z′U is always a feasible solution to (4.7),
JW,P(Z
′
U |W′) ≤ H(Z′U |W′), which gives the first inequality
in (4.9). To prove the second inequality, it suffices to show
I(W ∧ Z′U |W′) ≥ JD,P(Z′U |W′)
for all feasible solution W. To do so, notice that the con-
straint (4.7b) means that Z′C for C ∈ P are mutually
8independent given (W,W′), and so
I(W ∧ Z′U |W′) = H(Z′U |W′)−H(Z′U |W′,W)
(a)
=H(Z′U |W′)−
∑
C∈P
H(Z′C |W′,W)
(b)
=H(Z′U |W′)−
∑
C∈P
H(Z′C |W′,W,Z′U\C)
≥ H(Z′U |W′)−
∑
C∈P
H(Z′C |W′,Z′U\C)
= JD,P(Z
′
U |W′),
where we have applied the independence of Z′C’s in (a) to
rewrite H(Z′U |W′,W) as the sums
∑
C∈P H(Z
′
C |W′,W)
and in (b) to rewrite
∑
C∈P H(Z
′
C |W′,W) as∑
C∈P H(Z
′
C |W′,W,Z′U\C) respectively. 
When P is the partition into singletons, JD,P is Han’s dual
total correlation [34], which has been shown to be the best
entropic lower bound for JW,P even after incorporating non-
Shannon-type inequalities [35].
B. Main results
We give a single-letter lower bound on RS that improves
upon the result of Proposition 4.5 by allowing private random-
ization.
Theorem 4.1 For any source ZV ,
RS ≥ JW,P∗(ZV )− I(ZV )
≥ JD,P∗(ZV )− I(ZV )
(4.11a)
(4.11b)
where P∗ denotes P∗(ZV ) for convenience, and JW,P∗ and
JD,P∗ are the partition Wyner common information (4.7) and
the partition dual total correlation (4.10). ✷
PROOF See Appendix B-1. 
It was shown in [10, Theorem 6.3] that JD,P(ZV ) is no smaller
than I(ZV ) for all P ∈ Π′(V ), therefore, the lower bounds
above are non-negative.
Corollary 4.1 RS = RCO if JW,P∗(ZV ) = H(ZV ).
PROOF This follows from Theorem 4.1 by virtue of Proposi-
tion 4.1 and 4.2, i.e., substituting JW,P∗(ZV ) = H(ZV ) and
I(ZV ) = CS to the right hand side (r.h.s.) of (4.11a) gives
RCO. 
Compared to Proposition 4.5, (4.11a) is single-letter rather
than multi-letter. Furthermore, (4.11b) is a simple linear func-
tion of the entropy vector of ZV given P∗(ZV ), which is easier
to evaluate than (4.11a).
From Corollary 4.1, we obtain the following sufficient
condition for the optimality of omniscience under a general
source model:
Theorem 4.2 RS = RCO if
H(ZC |ZV \C) = 0 ∀C ∈ P∗(ZV ), (4.12)
where P∗ is the fundamental partition in Proposition 4.3,
namely, the finest optimal partition for the MMI (4.2a). ✷
PROOF The condition in (4.12) implies that JD,P∗(ZV ) =
H(ZV ), and therefore, by (4.9), we also have JW,P∗(ZV ) =
H(ZV ). The theorem now follows from Corollary 4.1. 
Condition (4.12) means that, for all C ∈ P∗(ZV ), no random-
ness of ZC is independent of ZV \C . This condition covers all
the existing results:
• (4.12) covers the condition for the 2-user case in Propo-
sition 2.1 because P∗(Z{1,2}) = {{1}, {2}}.
• (4.12) also extends the sufficiency part of the condition
in Proposition 4.4 because (4.12) holds for P∗(ZV ) =
{{i} : i ∈ V } trivially, as every edge variable Xe (e ∈
E) is a component of Zj and Zk for the distinct pair
{j, k} = ξ(e) of incident nodes.
Despite its generality, (4.12) can be checked easily because
P∗(ZV ) can be computed in strongly polynomial-time. The
following is an example for which the optimality of omni-
science can be easily derived by (4.12) but not by the existing
results.
Example 4.1 (4.12) holds for the source in Example 2.2 as
P∗(Z{1,2,3}) = {{1}, {2}, {3}}, and
H(Z1|Z2,Z3) = H(Z2|Z1,Z3) = H(Z3|Z1,Z2) = 0.
Hence, RS = RCO by Theorem 4.2. This example is not
covered by Proposition 4.4 because the private source belongs
to the more general finite linear source model [13] rather than
the PIN model (Definition 3.3) (or the hypergraphical source
model in Definition 3.2). ✷
C. Stronger Results for Hypergraphical Sources
The necessity of the condition in Proposition 4.4 can be
extended to the more general hypergraphical source model in
Definition 3.2:
Theorem 4.3 For hypergraphical sources with respect to the
hypergraph (V,E, ξ), we have RS = RCO iff
6 ∃e ∈ E such that ξ(e) ⊆ C for some C ∈ P∗(ZV ), (4.13)
which means that there does not exists a hyperedge entirely
contained by a part of the fundamental partition, i.e., every
hyperedge crosses the fundamental partition. ✷
PROOF See Section B-2. 
Example 4.2 Let Xa,Xb and Xc be uniformly random and
independent bits. With V := [5], define the private source as
Z1 := Xa
Z2 := Xb
Z3 := Xc
Z4 := (Xa,Xb)
Z5 := (Xa,Xb,Xc).
It is hypergraphical with edge function
ξ(e) =


{1, 4, 5} e = a
{2, 4, 5} e = b
{3, 5} e = c.
9To check condition (4.13), we can first obtain
I(ZV ) = 1 and P∗(ZV ) = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4, 5}}.
Then, (4.13) holds because every hyperedge crosses P∗(ZV ).
(4.12) also holds because, for every C ∈ P∗(ZV ), every edge
variable in ZC also appears in ZV \C . By Theorem 4.2,
RS = RCO = H(ZV )− I(ZV ) = 2 by (4.1).
This can be achieved non-asymptotically with n = 1, K :=
Z1 = Xa and F5 := (Xa ⊕ Xb,Xa ⊕ Xc). ✷
JW,P∗(ZV ) can be evaluated for hypergraphical sources
because its lower bound by (4.9) is tight:
Proposition 4.8 For hypergraphical sources with respect to
the hypergraph (V,E, ξ), we have
JW,P∗(ZV ) = H(XE∗) where
E∗ := {e ∈ E |6 ∃C ∈ P∗(ZV ), ξ(e) ⊆ C}
(4.14a)
(4.14b)
is the set of hyperedges that cross P∗(ZV ). Furthermore, an
optimal solution to (4.7) is W := (Xe | e ∈ E∗). ✷
PROOF See Appendix B-3. 
This means that the lower bound (4.11a) can be easily com-
puted for hypergraphical sources. Interestingly, while the lower
bound leads to a complete characterization of the optimality
of omniscience for the hypergraphical model, it may be loose
in general when condition (4.13) is not satisfied. A counter
example can be found even for the PIN model as follows.
Example 4.3 Let Xa, Xb and Xc be uniformly random and
independent bits. With V = [3], define
Z1 := Xa
Z2 := (Xa,Xb,Xc)
Z3 := (Xb,Xc),
(4.15)
which is a PIN. It can be shown that
I(ZV ) = 1 and P∗(ZV ) = {{1}, {2, 3}}.
The edge a is the only edge that crosses P∗(ZV ). Therefore,
JW,P∗(ZV ) = H(Xa) = 1, and so (4.11a) gives the trivial
lower bound RS ≥ 1− 1 = 0. However, it was proved in [36]
that RS = 1 for this example, and so the bound is loose. ✷
V. SINGLE-LETTER UPPER BOUNDS AND
NECESSARY CONDITIONS
In this section, we consider the general case S ( A, with
possibly helpers and silent users. The single-letter upper bound
on RS by RCO continues to hold in the more general case
because the omniscience strategy in Definition 3.1 can be
shown to be CS-achieving.
A. Smallest Rate of CO
The following result establishes the RCO upper bound on
RS and characterizes CS and RCO.
Theorem 5.1 With S ( A, the omniscience strategy in
Definition 3.1 is CS-achieving, with
CS = H(ZV \D\S | ZD)− ρ
RS ≤ RCO = ρ¯+ ρ
(5.1)
(5.2)
where ρ and ρ¯ are defined as the following linear programs:
ρ := min
{
r(V \D \ S) | rV \D\S ∈ RV \D\S ,
r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZV \S\B,Zj) ∀j ∈ A,B ⊆ V \D\S}
(5.3a)
(5.3b)
ρ¯ := min
{
r(D) | rD ∈ R(ZD),
r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZD\B,Zj) ∀j ∈ A,B ⊆ D}.
(5.4a)
(5.4b)
R(ZD) is defined in (3.16), and we have used the notation
rB := (ri | i ∈ B) and r(B) :=
∑
i∈B ri for any set B. ✷
PROOF See Appendix C-1. 
The single-letter characterizations for ρ and ρ¯ in (5.3) and
(5.4) can be computed in polynomial time,5 and hence, so can
CS and RCO. (5.1) covers the results of [1, 2] as the following
special cases:
Corollary 5.1 ([1, Theorem 2]) For S = ∅,
CS = H(ZV \D|ZD)− ρ where
ρ = min
{
r(V \D) | r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZV \B), ∀B ∈ H}
and H := {B ⊆ V \D | ∅ 6= B 6⊇ A}. ✷
PROOF When S = ∅, (5.3b) becomes
r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZV \B,Zj), ∀j ∈ A,B ⊆ V \D.
This yields the expression in the corollary after removing the
redundant constraints where B = ∅ or B ∋ j. 
Corollary 5.2 ([2, Theorem 6]) For S ( A = V ,
CS = H(ZV \S)− ρ where
ρ = min
{
r(V \ S) | r(B \ S) ≥ H(ZB\S |ZV \B), ∀B ∈ H}
and H := {B ⊆ V | ∅ 6= B 6⊇ A}. ✷
PROOF With S ( A = V , (5.3b) becomes
r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZV \S\B,Zj) ∀j ∈ A,B ⊆ V \ S.
The constraints with B ∋ j are again redundant and so we
can impose j 6∈ B. With B′ = B ∪ S \ {j}, the constraints
can be rewritten as
r(B′ \ S) ≥ H(ZB′\S |ZV \B′).
The constraints can only be weaker if some element in S is
removed from B′, as the r.h.s. cannot increase but the left hand
side (l.h.s.) remains unchanged. This yields the expression in
the corollary. 
5This can be argued as in [23] by noting that the separation oracle
corresponds to performing a polynomial number of submodular function
minimizations, which can be done in polynomial time.
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As illustrated by Example 3.1, ρ¯ can be strictly smaller than
H(ZD), i.e., the omniscience strategy is an improved version
of that [1] when S = ∅ 6= D. Consequently, the RCO upper
bound (5.2) is also improved.
B. Change of Scenario
In this section we will introduce some general techniques to
strengthen the upper bound on RS. In particular, we will make
use of the monotonicity of (CS, RS) with respect to certain
changes of scenario, namely the vector (A,S,D, V,ZV ) of
user sets and the private source. We first consider changes in
the user sets.
Theorem 5.2 Suppose (CS, RS) becomes (C
′
S, R
′
S) by one of
the following changes in the user sets:
(i) A vocal active user is turned into a silent active user, and
a new trusted helper with the same private source as the
original vocal active user is added. That is to say, (S, V )
becomes (S ∪ {i}, V ∪ {i′}) for some i ∈ A \ S, with
i′ /∈ V being a new user with private source Zi′ = Zi.
(ii) A trusted helper is removed, i.e., V becomes V \ {i} for
some i ∈ V \ (A ∪D).
Then, we have C′S ≤ CS. If equality holds, then R′S ≥ RS. ✷
PROOF See Appendix C-2. 
Therefore, using Theorem 5.2, if C′S = CS, then the RCO
of the new scenario can serve as an upper bound on the RS of
the original scenario. This leads to the following application.
Corollary 5.3 With S ( A, if CS remains unchanged after
(i) turning a proper subset of vocal active users into silent
active users, and
(ii) removing all the trusted helpers,
i.e., (S, V ) becomes (S′, V ′) causing (CS, RS, RCO) to
change to (C′S, R
′
S, R
′
CO), such that CS = C
′
S, V
′ = A ∪D,
S ⊆ S′ ( A. Then,
RS ≤ R′S ≤ R′CO ≤ RCO. (5.5)
It follows that RS = RCO only if CS 6= C′S or
H(ZV ′\S′) = H(ZV \S), (5.6)
i.e., H(Z(S′\S)∪(V \V ′)|ZV ′\S′) = 0. ✷
PROOF See Appendix C-2. 
The following is another application of Theorem 5.2 when
the entire set of vocal active users is turned into silent active
users.
Corollary 5.4 With S ( A, if
CS ≤ H(U|ZD) (5.7)
for any common function U such that
H(U|Zi) = 0 ∀i ∈ A, (5.8)
then RS = 0. In this case, RS = RCO iff RCO = 0, i.e.,
H(ZV \S |Zi) = 0, ∀i ∈ A. (5.9)
PROOF See Appendix C-2. 
Example 5.1 To illustrate Corollary 5.3, consider Exam-
ple 2.1 with A = V = {1, 2}, D = S = ∅,Z1 = (X0,X1)
and Z2 = (XJ, J). If we choose S
′ = {1} and everything
else the same, then condition (5.6) fails because H(Z2) =
2 < 3 = H(Z{1,2}), or equivalently, H(Z1|Z2) = 1 > 0, but
C′S = I(Z1 ∧ Z2) = CS, which follows from Proposition 6.4
and (4.2). Hence, by Corollary 5.3, RS < RCO as expected.✷
Example 5.2 The necessary condition (5.6) may not be suf-
ficient in general. For instance, consider Example 4.3 with
A = V = [3] but with S = {1, 3}. Note that the only possible
choice of S′ in (5.6) is S, and so (5.6) holds trivially. However,
by result of [37], it can be shown that the randomness
of Xc can be reduced without diminishing the capacity. In
this example, CS = min{I(Z1 ∧ Z2), I(Z2 ∧ Z3)} = 1
by Proposition 6.4, which remains unchanged even if Xc is
eliminated (doing so will only reduce I(Z2∧Z1) from 2 to 1).
Consequently, R′CO < RCO, and hence, RS ≤ R′S < RCO. ✷
The following is a single-letter bound that generalizes the
idea beyond the hypergraphical source.
Theorem 5.3 For any finite set Q, let
Z
(q)
i := ζ
(q)
i (Zi) ∀i ∈ V, q ∈ Q, (5.10)
and for some functions ζ
(q)
i such that
I(Z
(q)
V \D ∧ ZD|Z(q)D ) = 0 ∀q ∈ Q. (5.11)
If, for some random variable Q independent of ZV , we have
CS ≤ H(Z(Q)V \S |Q)−R′CO, (5.12)
where R′CO is the smallest rate of CO for Z
(Q)
V given Q (i.e.,
with Q observerd a priori), then
RS ≤ R′CO ≤ H(Z(Q)V \S |Q)− CS.✷ (5.13)
PROOF See Appendix C-3. 
This result covers the PIN model in Example 5.2, with Q
chosen to be deterministic and ZV processed to Z
′
V , where
Z′1 := Z1 = Xa, Z
′
2 := (Xa,Xb), Z
′
3 := Xb. The following
example shows that (5.11) is useful in handling the case with
untrusted helpers as well.
Example 5.3 Consider the same source as in Example 5.2
(Example 4.3) but with (A,S,D) = ({2, 3}, ∅, {1}) instead.
Then, CS = I(Z2 ∧ Z3|Z1) = 2. We process ZV to Z′V where
Z′2 = Z2 = (Xb,Xc), Z
′
3 = (Xb,Xc), and Z
′
1 is determinisitic.
Then, the secrecy capacity remains unchanged, i.e., equal to
I(Z′2 ∧ Z′3|Z′1) = 2, and I(Z′V \D ∧ ZD|Z′D) = I(Z′{2,3} ∧
Z1) = I(Xb,Xc ∧ Xa) = 0 satisfy (5.11). R′CO = 0 since
Z′{1,2,3} = Z
′
2 = Z
′
3, and so RS = 0 < RCO = H(Z1) = 1 by
Theorem 5.3, and so, omniscience is not optimal. ✷
Note that, in the above example, the edge variable Xc observed
by the untrusted user 3 can be removed without affecting RS.
This can be proved more generally:
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Proposition 5.1 For any random variable X independent of
ZV , consider the new scenario with ZV changed to Z
′
V where
Z
′
i =
{
(Zi,X) i ∈ T
Zi otherwise,
(5.14)
for some T ⊆ V such that T ∩D 6= ∅, i.e., X is observed by
the wiretapper. Then, both CS and RS remain unchanged. ✷
PROOF To prove Proposition 5.1, note that the proof of
Proposition 3.1 in Appendix A remains valid even if U˜i for
an untrusted user i ∈ D is observed by other user j ∈ V , i.e.,
with (3.5) modified to have Fi depend on U˜i directly. Hence,
with U˜i = X
n, the proof of Proposition 3.1 shows that Xn
neither increases CS nor decreases RS, as desired. 
Corollary 5.5 For any hypergraphical source, the hyperedges
e ∈ E with ξ(e) ∩ D 6= ∅ can be removed without changing
CS and RS. ✷
PROOF The corollary follows from Proposition 5.1 with Z′V
being the original hypergraphical source and ZV being the
source after removing the edge variable X := Xe. 
While Q was chosen to be deterministic for the previous
example, it is sometimes useful to make Q random as shown
by the following example.
Example 5.4 Let Xa,Xb,Xc,Xd and Xe be uniformly random
and independent bits, and define
Z1 := (Xa,Xb, Xe)
Z2 := (Xa,Xb,Xc)
Z3 := (Xc,Xd)
Z4 := (Xd,Xe)
With A = V = [4], S = D = ∅, we have
CS = I(ZV ) = 1.5 with
P∗(V ) = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}}
RCO = H(ZV )− I(ZV )
= 5− 1.5 = 3.5.
Let Q be a uniformly random bit independent of ZV and
process ZV to Z
(Q)
V with Z
(Q)
i := Zi for i ∈ {2, 3} but
Z
(Q)
1 :=
{
(Xa,Xb,Xe) if Q = 1
(Xa,Xb) otherwise, and
Z
(Q)
4 :=
{
(Xd,Xe) if Q = 1
Xd otherwise.
It follows that
H(Z
(Q)
{1,4}|Q) = 0.5H(X{a,b,d,e}) + 0.5H(X{a,b,d})
= 3.5 < 4 = H(Z{1,4}).
By Proposition 4.1 and 4.2, we have R′CO = H(Z
(Q)
V |Q) −
I(Z
(Q)
V |Q) = 4.5− 1.5 = 3, because
H(Z
(Q)
V |Q) =
4 + 5
2
= 4.5 and
I(Z
(Q)
V |Q) =
2.5 + 2.5 + 2 + 2− 4.5
3
= 1.5.
Hence,RS ≤ R′CO < RCO, and so omniscience is not optimal.
It can be seen the benefit of making Q random is that it
allows the edge e to be removed a fraction (half) of the time.
Note that a complete removal of the edge, i.e., with Q =
0 deterministically, is suboptimal, because it diminishes the
secrecy capacity, i.e.,
I(Z
(Q)
V |Q = 0) =
2 + 2 + 2 + 2− 4
3
=
4
3
< 1.5.✷
The following example shows that Theorem 5.3 is useful for
more general sources that are not necessarily hypergraphical.
Example 5.5 Let X0,X1 and J be uniformly random and
independent bits, and define
Z1 := (J,X0 ⊕ X1)
Z2 := (X0,X1)
Z3 := XJ.
With A = V = [3] and S = D = ∅, we have CS = I(ZV ) = 1
and RCO = H(ZV ) − I(ZV ) = 2. Now, with Z′i := Zi for
i ∈ {2, 3} and
Z
′
1 :=
{
(J,X0 ⊕ X1) if X0 6= X1, i.e., X0 ⊕ X1 = 1,
X0 ⊕ X1 otherwise,
(or, alternatively, Z′1 := (2J−1) · (X0⊕X1) which takes value
from {−1, 0, 1}.) It follows that
H(Z′1)
(a)
=H(X0 ⊕ X1,Z′1)
= H(X0 ⊕ X1) +H(Z′1|X0 ⊕ X1)
(b)
=1 + 0.5 = 1.5 < 2 = H(Z1)
where (a) is because Z′1 determines X0 ⊕ X1; (b) is because
H(Z′1|X0⊕X1 = 0) = 0 while H(Z′1|X0⊕X1 = 1) = H(J) =
1. Using this, it can be shown that (C′S, R
′
CO) is given by C
′
S =
I(Z′V ) = 1 and R
′
CO = H(Z
′
V ) − I(Z′V ) = 2.5 − 1 = 1.5.
By Theorem 5.3, we have RS ≤ R′CO < RCO, and so the
omniscience strategy is not optimal. Indeed, it can be shown
that RS = 1.5 by the result of [36].
As an interesting side note, although the omniscience strat-
egy is not optimal, it can be non-asymptotic, for instance,
by setting n = 1, K = XJ, F1 = J, F2 = X1−J and
F3 deterministic. However, it seems impossible to achieve
RS ≤ 1.5 non-asymptotically. To construct an asymptotic
scheme, note that the fraction of time X0 ⊕ X1 = 0 is 1/2
almost surely as n→∞ by the law of large number. Whenever
X0 ⊕ X1 = 0, both user 1 and 2 knows. In particular, user 2
can recover X1−J even without knowing J since X0 = X1.
Hence, XJ can potentially be used as a secret key bit without
omniscience of the source, i.e., without user 2 knowing J
all the time. To do so, however, the public discussion must
be chosen carefully in order not to let the wiretapper know
the time instances when X0 = X1. This can be done by
an asymptotic scheme, where the realizations of J for the
time instances when X0 6= X1 are concatenated and then
truncated/zero-padded by user 1 to form a sequence of length
n/2+
√
n. Then, the sequence can be revealed in public as F1,
which does not leak any information about the time instances
where X0 = X1. Since user 2 can recover X0 ⊕ X1 from his
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private observation, he can recover the sequence of realizations
of ZJ−1 almost completely (close to a fraction of 1 by the law
of large number) and reveal it in public as F2. Hence, almost
the entire sequence of XJ can be recovered by everyone and
used as the secret key. ✷
VI. SINGLE-LETTER LOWER BOUNDS AND
SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS
In this section, we derive general single-letter bounds on RS.
We will first extend the definitions in (4.2) to characterize CS.
A. Fractional Partition Information
We will use the following generalization of the notion of
partitions. For a finite set U , a fractional partition is a non-
negative set function λ : 2U → R+ that satisfies∑
B⊆U :i∈B
λ(B) = 1 ∀i ∈ U. (6.1)
For a set family H ⊆ 2U \ {∅}, we use Λ(U,H) to denote the
set of fractional partitions λ whose support lies within H, i.e.,
supp(λ) := {B ⊆ U | λ(B) > 0} ⊆ H. (6.2)
For instance, the indicator function χP of a partition P ∈
Π(U) is a fractional partition, i.e.,
λ(B) = χP(B) =
{
1 B ∈ P
0 otherwise.
(6.3)
However, the notion of fractional partition is more general. An
important case of interest is
λ(C) =
χP(U \ C)
|P| − 1 =
{
1
|P|−1 U \ C ∈ P
0 otherwise,
(6.4)
for some P ∈ Π′(U). This is called a co-partition.
Definition 6.1 ([10, (4.4b)]) For a finite set U with size
|U | > 1, λ ∈ Λ(U, 2U\{∅, U}) and a random vector (Z′U ,W′),
define the (conditional) fractional partition information as
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′) := H(Z′U |W′)−
∑
B∈2U\{∅,U}
λ(B)H(Z′B |Z′U\B,W′). (6.5)
For P ∈ Π′(U), IP (Z′U |W′) (4.2b) and JD,P(Z′V |W′) (4.10)
are the special cases of Iλ(Z
′
U |W′) when λ satisfies (6.4) and
(6.3) respectively. ✷
The secrecy capacity was first characterized using fractional
partitions in [38]. Iλ for different values of λ was introduced
in [10] as the space of information measures relating various
multivariate information measures.
The secrecy capacity in the case without silent users can be
characterized by Iλ as follows:
Proposition 6.1 ([38, Theorem 3.1]) For S = ∅,
CS = min
λ∈Λ(V \D,H)
Iλ(ZV \D|ZD) (6.6)
where H := {B ⊆ V \D : ∅ 6= B 6⊇ A}. ✷
Like IP(ZV ) (4.2b), Iλ(Z
′
V ) (6.5) is also non-negative [38],
which is a consequence of the Shearer-type lemma in [39].
We will need the stronger statement below (with an equality
condition):
Proposition 6.2 ([10, Lemma 6.1]) For any random vector
(Z′U ,W
′) and λ ∈ Λ(U, 2U \{∅, U}), we have Iλ(Z′U |W′) ≥ 0
with equality iff
I(Z′B ∧ Z′U\B |W′) = 0 ∀B ∈ supp(λ), (6.7)
which is the condition in terms of Shannon’s mutual informa-
tion for the fractional partition information to be zero. ✷
For completeness, we will prove a stronger version of the
result in Appendix D-1.
As pointed out in [10, Footnote 17], Iλ (6.5) also satisfies
the data processing inequality [10, (5.20b)]. We will use the
following more elaborate version:
Lemma 6.1 For any random vector (Z′U ,W
′,Y′), λ ∈
Λ(U, 2U \ {∅, U}) and i ∈ U , we have
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′) ≥ Iλ(Z′′U |W′)− δ, (6.8)
where
Z′′j :=
{
Y′, j = i
Z′j , j ∈ U \ {i}
and
δ :=

 ∑
B∈2U\{∅,U}
λ(B) − 1

 I(Y′ ∧ Z′U\{i}|W′,Z′i).
Furthermore,
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′) ≥ Iλ(Z′U |W′,Y′)− δ + γ, (6.9)
where
γ := min
B∈supp(λ):
i∈B
max
j∈U\B
I(Y′ ∧ Z′j|W′)
and δ is as defined for (6.8). ✷
PROOF See Appendix D-2. 
(6.8) and (6.9) can be viewed as the extensions of the following
well-known data processing inequality in the bivariate case
U = {1, 2} for the Markov chain Z′1 − Z′2 − Y′ (i.e., I(Z′1 ∧
Y′|Z′2) = 0):
I(Z′1 ∧ Z′2) ≥ I(Z′1 ∧ Y′) and
I(Z′1 ∧ Z′2) ≥ I(Z′1 ∧ Z′2|Y′) + I(Z′1 ∧ Y′).
(6.10a)
(6.10b)
More precisely, Λ(U, 2U \ {∅, U}) contains only the partition
(co-partition) λ with λ({1}) = λ({2}) = 1. With i = 2
and W′ = ∅, (6.8) reduces to (6.10a), while (6.9) reduces
to (6.10b).
B. General lower bound
The lower bound on RS will be stated and derived using
the following single-letter expression that extends the partition
Wyner common information (4.7):
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Definition 6.2 For a finite set U with size |U | > 1, random
vector (Z′U ,W
′) and λ ∈ Λ(U, 2U \ {∅, U}),
JW,λ(Z
′
U |W′) := inf{I(W ∧ Z′U |W′) |
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′,W) = 0}.
(6.11a)
(6.11b)
For any partition P ∈ Π′(U), JW,P(Z′U |W′) (4.7) is the
special case when λ satisfies (6.4). In the bivariate case
U = {i, j} where i 6= j, it reduces to JW(Z′i ∧ Z′j |W′) [32].✷
A bound on the support size of W similar to Wyner common
information can be imposed to make the computation more
tractable.
Proposition 6.3 It is admissible to have |W | ≤ |Z ′U ||W ′|
in (6.11), in which the “inf” can be replaced by “min”. ✷
PROOF This follows from Lemma D.4 and (D.15) in Ap-
pendix D-3. 
The desired lower bound on RS is:
Theorem 6.1 For the general scenario S ( A, if we have
CS = Iλ(ZU |ZD) for some λ ∈ Λ(U,H) where
U ⊆ V is such that V \D \ S ⊆ U ⊆ V \D and
H := {B ⊆ U | ∅ 6= B 6⊇ A ∩ U},
(6.12a)
(6.12b)
(6.12c)
then the communication complexity is lower bounded as
RS ≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(F|Z˜D)
≥ JW,λ(ZU |ZD)− Iλ(ZU |ZD), (6.13)
which is in fact a lower bound on the total discussion rate of
the trusted users, since H(F|Z˜D) = H(FV \D\S |Z˜D). ✷
PROOF See Appendix D-3. 
C. With helpers
In this section, we specialize the results to the scenario A ⊆
V but S = D = ∅. This will be assumed throughout the
section, unless otherwise stated.
Theorem 6.2 Let Λ∗(A,ZV ) be the set of optimal fractional
partitions in the characterization (6.6) of CS by Iλ, and
H := {B, V \B | B ∈ supp(λ∗), λ∗ ∈ Λ∗(A,ZV )} . (6.14)
Then,
RS ≥ max
λ∗∈Λ∗(A,ZV )
JW,λ∗(ZV )− CS
≥ Iλ(ZV )− CS,
(6.15a)
(6.15b)
for any λ ∈ Λ(V,H). ✷
PROOF See Appendix D-4. 
Theorem 6.3 RS = RCO if, for H defined in (6.14),
∃λ ∈ Λ(V,H), Iλ(ZV ) = H(ZV ), (6.16)
i.e., H(ZB|ZV \B) = 0 for all B ∈ supp(λ). ✷
PROOF This follows immediately from Theorem 6.2 by mak-
ing use of Proposition 6.1 with D = S = ∅. 
Note that (4.11a) is the special case of (6.15a) when λ is
chosen to be (6.4) for the fundamental partition P∗(ZV ),
and (4.11b) is the special case of (6.15b) when λ is chosen to
be (6.3) for the fundamental partition P∗(ZV ). The sufficient
condition (4.12) in Theorem 4.2 also follows from Theo-
rem 6.3 when λ satisfies (6.3) for the fundamental partition
P∗(ZV ).
The following is an example taken from [10, Example
A.1]. It has the property that the optimal λ∗ to (6.6) is not
the co-partition (i.e., the divergence upper bound [1, (26)
in Example 4] is loose), unlike the case with no helpers in
Theorem 4.1.
Example 6.1 Let Z4,Z5 and Z6 be independent uniformly
random bits, and define
Z1 := Z5 ⊕ Z6
Z2 := Z4 ⊕ Z6
Z3 := Z4 ⊕ Z5
With V := [6] and A = [3], it can be shown that
Λ∗(A,ZV ) = {λ∗} where
λ∗(B) ∈
{
0,
1
4
}
for B ⊆ V \ {∅} and
supp(λ∗) =
{
{2, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 6},
V \ {1}, V \ {2}, V \ {3}
}
.
Consider the fractional partition λ with
λ(B) :=
{
1
2 if V \B ∈ supp(λ∗)
0 otherwise.
It can be checked that λ ∈ Λ(V,H) with H defined in (6.14),
using the fact that every i ∈ V appears in exactly two
subsets of supp(λ), which is a subset of H. We also have
Iλ(ZV ) = H(ZV ) since H(ZB|ZV \B) = 0 for all B ∈
supp(λ). It follows from Theorem 6.3 that RS = RCO, and
so omniscience is optimal. ✷
The following example shows that not only is the lower
bound (6.15) loose, but the sufficient condition is also not
necessary, even for a simple PIN (Definition 3.3).
Example 6.2 Let Xa and Xb be uniformly random and inde-
pendent bits. With V := [3], let
Z1 := Xa
Z2 := (Xa,Xb)
Z3 := Xb,
which is the same as the source in Example 4.3 but with Xc
removed. Consider A = {1, 3}, S = D = ∅. Then, CS in (6.6)
is 1, where the extremal6 optimal solutions are λ(1) and λ(2)
defined as
λ(1)(B) =
{
1 if B ∈ {{1, 2}, {3}}
0 otherwise,
and
λ(2)(B) =
{
1 if B ∈ {{1}, {2, 3}}
0 otherwise.
6All other solutions can be expressed as convex combinations of the
extremal solutions.
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It can be achieved non-asymptotically with n = 1 and
(K,F) = (Xa,Xa ⊕ Xb). The support (6.14) for the optimal
λ’s is H = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1}, {3}}. The lower bound on RS
given by Theorem 6.2 is trivial since λ(1) and λ(2) are the
only feasible choices supported by H, i.e., it is easy to see
that Λ(V,H) = {λ(1), λ(2)}. However, by the result of [36], it
can be shown that omniscience is indeed optimal in this case,
i.e., RS = 1. ✷
D. With Silent Users
This section considers the scenario S ( A = V , i.e, all the
users are active but some of them may be forced to be silent.
This will be assumed throughout the section unless otherwise
stated. We begin by providing an alternate characterization of
the secrecy capacity in [2, Theorem 6].
Proposition 6.4
CS =
{
min
i∈S
I(ZV \S ∧ Zi) if |V \ S| = 1
min{α, I(ZV \S)} if |V \ S| > 1,
(6.18a)
(6.18b)
where α := mini∈S I(ZV \S ∧ Zi). ✷
PROOF See Appendix D-5 
The result can be easily extended to the case with untrusted
helpers, i.e., S ( A = V \D with D possibly non-empty. To
be precise, we have
CS =
{
min
i∈S
I(Z(V \D)\S ∧ Zi|ZD) if |(V \D) \ S| = 1
min{α, I(Z(V \D)\S |ZD)} if |(V \D) \ S| > 1
where α := mini∈S I(Z(V \D)\S ∧ Zi|ZD).
We now turn our attention to lower bounding RS for the
case with S ( A = V . For this, we introduce some convenient
notation, starting with the definition
S∗ := {i ∈ S | I(ZV \S ∧ Zi) = α}, (6.19)
where α is as defined in Proposition 6.4. We extend the
notation introduced in Theorem 4.1: for any U ⊆ V , the
P∗ in the subscripts of JW,P∗(ZU ), JD,P∗(ZU ) and IP∗(ZU )
denotes the fundamental partition P∗(ZU ).
Applying the lower bound in Theorem 4.1 with an appro-
priate choice of U and P ∈ Π′(U) yields the following result.
Theorem 6.4
RS ≥


JW,P∗(ZV \S)− I(ZV \S)
if I(ZV \S) < α and |V \ S| > 1,
max
i∈S∗
JW(ZV \S ∧ Zi)− α,
if |V \ S| = 1,
or, if I(ZV \S) > α and |V \ S| > 1,
max
i∈S∗
JW,P∗(Z(V \S)∪{i})− α,
if I(ZV \S) = α and |V \ S| > 1,
(6.20a)
(6.20b)
(6.20c)
where S∗ is as defined in (6.19). ✷
PROOF See Appendix D-5 
The lower bounds in Theorem 6.4 can be weakened by
replacing JW,P with the more easily computable JD,P . Using
arguments similar to those in Section IV, we arrive at the
following sufficient condition for RS = RCO to hold.
Theorem 6.5 RS = RCO in either of the following scenarios:
(i) H(ZC |ZV \C) = 0, ∀C ∈ P∗(ZV \S), when |V \ S| > 1
and I(ZV \S) < α,
(ii) ∃i ∈ S∗ such that H(ZV \S |Zi) = 0, when |V \ S| = 1,
or when |V \ S| > 1 and I(ZV \S) > α,
(iii) ∃i ∈ S∗ such that H(ZC |ZV \S\C ,Zi) = 0, ∀C ∈
P∗(ZV \S) ∪ {i}, when |V \ S| > 1 and I(ZV \S) = α,
where S∗ is as defined in (6.19). ✷
PROOF See Appendix D-5 
Example 6.3 Consider the PIN in Example 6.2 with A =
V = [3]. We consider the following cases:
• S = {3}: It is easy to verify that I(ZV \S) = 1 with
P∗(ZV \S) = {{1}, {2}}, and α = I(Z{1,2} ∧ Z3) = 1 =
I(ZV \S). It is obvious that S
∗ = S = {3}. Therefore, the
condition for Theorem 6.5.(iii) holds and so RS = RCO.
• S = {2}: Again, it is easy to verify that I(ZV \S) =
I(Z{1,3}) = 0 and P∗(ZV \S) = {{1}, {3}}. Also,
α = I(Z{1,3} ∧ Z2) = 2 > I(ZV \S). Now, as
H(Z3|Z1) = 1 > 0, Theorem 6.5.(i) fails to confirm
whether RS = RCO. However, it is easy to see that
CS = 0 and RCO = 2, which follows using Theorem 6 of
[2] and Proposition 6.4. Therefore,RS = 0 holds trivially,
and hence RS < RCO.
• S = {1, 3}: In this case, we have |V \S| = 1 and see that
α = min{I(Z2 ∧ Z3), I(Z2 ∧ Z1)} = 1, with S∗ = S =
{1, 3}. However, it turns out that H(Z2|Zi) = 1 > 0, i =
1, 3, and hence Theorem 6.5.(ii) is unable to conclude
whether RS = RCO.
We remark here that for the special case of a hypergraphical
source (as defined in Definition 3.2), the sufficient conditions
in Theorem 6.5 can be strengthened to a necessary and
sufficient condition for RS = RCO. (See Theorem 6.7.) Using
the stronger result, we can show that RS = RCO holds for the
last case when S = {1, 3}. ✷
E. The Hypergraphical Source with Silent Users
In this section, we restrict our attention to the hypergraphical
source with silent users, i.e, S ( A = V . The goal of this
section is to strengthen the sufficient conditions for RS = RCO
given in Theorem 6.5. We will show that the strengthened
conditions are both necessary and sufficient for RS = RCO to
be valid, as promised in Example 6.3.
The idea is based on the following observation.
Proposition 6.5 For any hypergraphical source, (V,E, ξ),
CS, RS and RCO remain unchanged by removing any hyper-
edge e′ ∈ E such that ξ(e′) ⊆ S. ✷
PROOF See Appendix D-6 
Thanks to this fact we will assume that the hypergraphical
sources considered later in this section satisfy
∀e ∈ E, ξ(e) 6⊆ S. (6.21)
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Using (6.21), the lower bound in Theorem 6.4 can be
strengthened to the following for the hypergraphical source.
Theorem 6.6 For any hypergraphical source (V,E, ξ) with
S ( A = V , we have
RS ≥


JW,P∗(ZV \S)− I(ZV \S)
if I(ZV \S) < α and |V \ S| > 1,
JW,(V \S)∪{{i}|i∈S∗}(Z(V \S)∪S∗)− α,
if |V \ S| = 1,
or, if I(ZV \S) > α and |V \ S| > 1,
JW,P∗(ZV \S)∪{{i}|i∈S∗}(Z(V \S)∪S∗)− α,
if I(ZV \S) = 1 and |V \ S| > 1,
(6.22a)
(6.22b)
(6.22c)
where S∗ is as defined in (6.19). ✷
PROOF See Appendix D-6 
The results of Theorem 6.6 can be used to obtain sufficient
conditions for RS = RCO to hold, by following the same steps
as in the proof of Theorem 6.5. Fortunately, it turns out that
those conditions are also necessary, a fact that can be proved
using the idea of decremental secret key agreement highlighted
in [37].
Theorem 6.7 For any hypergraphical source (V,E, ξ) with
S ( A = V , we have RCO = RS iff
(i) H(ZC |ZV \C) = 0, ∀C ∈ P∗(ZV \S), when |V \ S| > 1
and I(ZV \S) < α,
(ii) H(ZV \S |ZS∗) = 0, when |V \ S| = 1 or, if |V \ S| > 1
and I(ZV \S) > α,
(iii) H(ZC |Z((V \S)∪S∗)\C) = 0, ∀C ∈ P∗(ZV \S), when |V \
S| > 1 and I(ZV \S) = α. ✷
PROOF See Appendix D-6 
F. With Untrusted Users
The lower bounds and sufficient conditions derived so far
(Theorems 4.2–4.3 and Theorems 6.2–6.7) can all be extended
to the case with untrusted helpers by further conditioning on
ZD in the entropies, as in Theorem 6.1. For hypergraphical
sources, this is equivalent to removing the hyperedges incident
on D, as in Corollary 5.5.
VII. CHALLENGES
In this section, we conclude our work by explaining some
challenges that remain and techniques that potentially improve
the results derived so far.
A. Limitation
We first show that the sufficient condition in Theorem 4.2
for the optimality of omniscience may not be necessary for the
following example from [17], resolving the conjecture therein.
Example 7.1 Let Xa,Xb,Xc and Xd be uniformly random and
independent bits, and define
Z1 := Xa
Z2 := Xb
Z3 := Xc
Z4 := (Xa,Xb,Xc ⊕ Xd)
Z5 := (Xa,Xb,Xd).
With A = V := [5] and S = ∅, it can be shown that
CS = I(ZV ) = 1 with P∗(ZV ) = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4, 5}}
RCO = H(ZV )− CS = 3
JW,P∗(ZV ) = JD,P∗(ZV ) = 3 < H(ZV ) = 4
with W = (X{a,b,c}). To achieve the capacity, we can choose
for n = 1
K := Z1 = Xa
F4 := Xc ⊕ Xd
F5 := (Xa ⊕ Xb,Xa ⊕ Xd),
which also achieves omniscience at the minimum rate.
Note that the sufficient condition (4.12) for the optimality
of omniscience does not hold because
H(Z{4,5}|Z{1,2,3}) = H(Xd,Xc ⊕ Xd|Xc) = 1 > 0.
The following result will show that omniscience is indeed
optimal for this example, and so the sufficient condition is
not necessary. Furthermore, since the sufficient condition is
derived from the lower bound (4.11) on RS, the bound is also
loose for this example. ✷
Proposition 7.1 For Example 7.1, RS = RCO. ✷
PROOF See Appendix E-1. 
B. Potential Improvements
In this section, we give some potential improvements of the
lower bound by a change of scenario.
Theorem 7.1 CS and RS remain unchanged by the following
change of user sets:
(i) A vocal untrusted user is turned into a silent untrusted
user, and a new trusted helper with the same private
source as the original vocal untrusted user is added. That
is to say, (S, V ) becomes (S ∪ {i}, V ∪ {i′}) for some
i ∈ D \S and with i′ 6∈ V being a new user with private
source Zi′ = Zi identical to that of i.
(ii) A trusted helper i ∈ V \A\S \D with H(Zi|Zj) = 0 for
some vocal user j ∈ V \ S is removed, i.e., V becomes
V \ {i}. ✷
PROOF See Appendix E-2 
Theorem 7.2 Suppose (CS, RS) becomes (C
′
S, R
′
S) by one of
the following change of user sets:
(i) a silent user is removed, i.e., (A,S,D, V ) becomes
(A,S \ {i}, D \ {i}, V \ {i}) for some i ∈ S ∩ D, or
(A \ {i}, S \ {i}, D, V \ {i}) for some i ∈ A ∩ S.
(ii) a silent active user is turned into a vocal active user, i.e.,
S becomes S \ {i} for some i ∈ A ∩ S.
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Then, C′S ≥ CS. If equality holds, then R′S ≤ RS. ✷
PROOF See Appendix E-2 
Example 7.2 Let Xa and Xb be independent uniformly ran-
dom bits. Consider the PIN in Example 6.2 but with user 4
added so that the private source consists of
Z1 := Xa
Z2 := (Xa,Xb)
Z3 := Xb
Z4 := Xb
Suppose (A,S,D) = ([3], {1, 3}, ∅). It can be shown that
CS = RCO = 1, which is achievable non-asymptotically
with n = 1 and (K,F) = (Z1,F2) = (Za,Za ⊕ Zb). We
can apply (ii) in Theorem 7.1 to remove the trusted user 4,
since H(Z4|Z2) = 0 and 2 ∈ V \ S. With V changed to
V ′ = {1, 2, 3}, the CS and RS remain unchanged. Since
the model is hypergraphical (in particular, a PIN), we can
apply Theorem 6.6 to show that RS of the new scenario is at
least 1, and so RS = RCO = 1 in the original scenario by
Theorem 7.1 ✷
The following conjectures, if proven correct, can further
improve the lower bound (6.13). They are true if one can
prove the stronger conjecture in [5] that private randomization
does not decrease RS.
Conjecture 1 RS does not increase by
(i) making a trusted helper active provided that the private
source of the helper determines that of another active
user.
(ii) forcing a vocal active user silent if its source is deter-
mined by that of another vocal user. ✷
Example 7.3 Consider the PIN in Example 6.2 with V = [3].
Let (A,S,D) = ({1, 3}, ∅, ∅). As discussed in Example 6.2,
the lower bound (6.13) fails to show RS ≥ 1. However, if
the conjecture above is proved, then we could apply (i) in the
conjecture to turn the trusted helper into an active vocal user,
in which case RS = 1 as described in the previous example
for the new scenario. ✷
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1
Consider j ∈ D first. As will be useful to a later result, we
will prove the stronger statement that Uj neither increases CS
nor decreases RS even when Uj is a public randomization [13]
observed by everyone in addition to the wiretapper, i.e.,
with (3.5) modified to have Fi depend directly on Uj . To
do so, it suffices to show that the recoverability (3.7) and
secrecy (3.8) constraints continue to hold even if Uj is chosen
to be deterministic. More precisely, for any δ > 0, let
Uj(δ) :=
{
u ∈ Uj |
Pr(∃i ∈ A,K 6= θi(Z˜i,F) | Uj = u) ≤ δ,
1
n
[
log|K| −H(K|F, Z˜D,Uj = u)
]
≤ δ
}
.
(A.1a)
(A.1b)
We have the desired result if Uj(δn) 6= ∅ for some δn → 0
since, by choosing Uj to be deterministically equal to any
element in Uj(δn), (A.1a) and (A.1b) implies (3.7) and (3.8)
respectively. Indeed, not only can we show that Uj(δ) 6= ∅,
i.e., Pr(Uj ∈ Uj(δ)) > 0, but also that
lim
n→∞
Pr(Uj ∈ Uj(δ)) = 1 ∀δ > 0. (A.2)
Let U ′j(δ) be the set Uj(δ) in (A.1) with only (A.1a) (but not
(A.1b)) imposed. Similarly, let U ′′j (δ) to be the set with only
(A.1b) imposed. It follows that
Uj(δ) = U
′
j(δ) ∩ U ′′j (δ)
and so, by the union bound,
Pr(Uj ∈ Uj(δ)) ≥ 1− Pr(Uj 6∈ U ′j(δ))− Pr(Uj 6∈ U ′′j (δ)).
It suffices to show that the last two probabilities go to 0
asymptotically in n. By the Markov inequality,
Pr(Uj 6∈ U ′j(δ)) ≤ Pr(∃i∈A,K 6=θi(Z˜i,F))δ
Pr(Uj 6∈ U ′′j (δ)) ≤
1
n [log|K|−H(K|F,Z˜D ,Uj)]
δ .
The bounds go to zero as desired by (3.7) and (3.8), hence
completing the proof of (A.2).
Consider the remaining case j ∈ S. (Unlike the previous
case, we do not consider Uj is a public randomization here.)
Note that
I(Uj ∧ Z˜V \{j},F) = 0 (A.3)
because F in (3.5) does not depend on Uj as user j is silent,
and the Uj is independent of Z˜V \{j} by the assumption (3.11).
We will show that this implies that
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(Uj ∧ K|F, Z˜D) = 0 (A.4)
Since |A| ≥ 2, there exists another active user, say i ∈ A\{j}.
By the recoverability condition (3.7) for user i (which does
not depend on Uj), we have
lim
n→∞
Pr{K 6= θi(Z˜i,F)} = 0
which gives
I(Uj ∧ K|F, Z˜D)
(a)
≤ I(Uj ∧ Z˜i,F|F, Z˜D) + nδn (b)= nδn
for some δn → 0. Here, (a) follows from Fano’s inequality,
and (b) is because
I(Uj ∧ Z˜i,F|F, Z˜D) ≤ I(Uj ∧ Z˜i,F, Z˜D)
≤ I(Uj ∧ Z˜V \{j},F),
which equals zero by (A.3), completing the proof of (A.4).
Now, by (3.8),
0 = lim
n→∞
1
n
[
log|K| −H(K|F, Z˜D)
]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
[
log|K| −H(K|F, Z˜D,Uj)
]
= lim
n→∞
1
n
[
log|K| −max
u∈Uj
H(K|F, Z˜D,Uj = u)
]
where the second equality follows from (A.4). Hence, by
setting Uj = u deterministically, (3.8) remains to hold (since
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maxu∈Uj H(K|F, Z˜D,Uj = u) = H(K|F, Z˜D) in the above).
Furthermore, (3.7) (without Uj) also hold by (A.4). This
completes the proof of the proposition.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR SECTION IV
1. Proof of Theorem 4.1
It is enough to prove (4.11a), since (4.11b) then follows
from (4.9). Let UV be the optimal sequence of randomization
that achieves RS, and let R
NR
S (Z˜V ) be the communication
complexity when the source ZV is changed to Z˜V instead (see
(3.4) for the definition of Z˜V ). Then,
RS(ZV )
(a)
≥ 1
n
RNRS (Z˜V )
(b)
≥ 1
n
[CW(Z˜V )− I(Z˜V )]
(c)
≥ 1
n
[nJW,P∗(ZV )− I(Z˜V )]
(d)
= JW,P∗(ZV )− I(ZV )
• To explain (a), note that the secrecy capacity of the new
scenario is nCS, since randomization does not change the
secrecy capacity [1]. Any optimal scheme that achieves
RS for the original scenario can therefore be translated
directly to a scheme that achieves nRS for the new
scenario without randomization.
• (b) is by Proposition 4.5 with ZV replaced by Z˜V , and
CW(Z˜V ) denoting the corresponding multi-letter multi-
variate Wyner common information (4.5).
• (c) follows from
CW(Z˜V ) ≥ nJW,P∗(ZV ), (B.1)
which will be argued in more detail later.
• To explain (d), note that for all B ⊆ V ,
H(Z˜B) = H(Z
n
B,UB)
= nH(ZB) +H(UB),
which gives
IP(Z˜V ) = nIP(ZV ) + IP(UV )
for all P ∈ Π′(V ). Since IP (UV ) = 0 by the fact that the
Ui’s are mutually independent (3.3), the above equation
implies I(Z˜V ) = nI(ZV ) as desired.
To explain (B.1), consider the optimal sequence in n′ of L to
CW(Z˜V ). By standard arguments,
H(L) ≥ I(Z˜n′V ∧ L) ≥ I(Znn
′
V ∧ L)
= H(Znn
′
V )−H(Znn
′
V |L)
=
nn′∑
t=1
H(ZV t)−
nn′∑
t=1
H(ZV t|Zt−1V , L)
where the second inequality follows from the usual data
processing inequality (see (6.10a)) since ZnV is determined
by Z˜V , and so, we have the Markov chain L − Z˜n′V − Znn
′
V .
Let J be the usual time-sharing random variable uniformly
distributed over [nn′] and independent of everything else,
namely (Z˜n
′
V , L), and define
WJ := (J,Z
J−1
V , L).
Then, the above inequality gives
1
n′
H(L) ≥ nI(ZV J ∧WJ). (B.2)
On the other hand, we can also bound IP∗ in the con-
straint (4.5b) of CW as follows:
IP∗(Z˜V )(Z˜
n′
V |L) ≥ IP∗(ZV )(Znn
′
V |L)
=
1
|P∗| − 1
[ ∑
C∈P∗
H(Znn
′
C |L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,
−H(Znn′V |L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2,
]
where, as in the statement of the theorem, P∗ denotes P∗(ZV )
for convenience. In the above inequality, we have applied
P∗(Z˜V ) = P∗(ZV ) and the data processing inequality [10,
(5.20b)] since Zni is determined by Z˜i. (See also (6.8) with Iλ
reduces to IP by restricting λ to (6.4).) Expanding 1, and 2,
by the chain rule,
1,=
nn′∑
t=1
H(ZCt|L,Zt−1C )
≥
nn′∑
t=1
H(ZCt|L,Zt−1V ) =nn′H(ZCJ|WJ)
2,=
nn′∑
t=1
H(ZV t|L,Zt−1V ) = nn′H(ZV J|WJ).
Altogether, we have
1
n′
IP∗(Z˜V )(Z˜
n′
V |L)
≥ n|P∗| − 1
[ ∑
C∈P∗
H(ZCJ|WJ)−H(ZV J|WJ)
]
= nIP∗(ZV J|WJ), (B.3)
Now, for δ ≥ 0, define
Γ(δ) := sup
PW|ZV :IP∗ (ZV |W)≤δ
H(ZV |W), (B.4)
where the supremum is over all possible choices of the condi-
tional distribution PW|ZV . The expression depends implicitly
on the distribution PZV . It follows that
Γ
(
1
nn′ IP∗(Z˜V )(Z˜
n′
V |L)
)
≥ H(ZV J|WJ)
since ZV J has the same distribution as ZV and so the condi-
tional distribution PWJ|ZV J is a feasible solution to (B.4) with
δ chosen appropriately from the bound (B.3) on IP∗(ZV J|WJ).
Together with (B.2), we have
CW(Z˜V ) ≥ lim
n′→∞
n
[
H(ZV J)− Γ
(
1
nn′ IP∗(Z˜V )(Z˜
n′
V |L)
)]
= n
[
H(ZV )− lim
δ→0
Γ(δ)
]
where the last equality is because H(ZV J) = H(ZV ) and
1
n′ IP∗(Z˜V )(Z˜
n′
V |L) goes to 0 as n′ goes to ∞ by the constraint
(4.5b) for CW(Z˜V ). It can be shown that Γ(δ) is continuous
in δ using the same argument as in [32]. For completeness,
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this is proved for the more general case in Lemma D.4 in
Appendix D-3. Hence,
CW(Z˜V ) ≥ n [H(ZV )− Γ(0)]
= nJW,P∗(ZV )
by the definition (4.7) of JW,P .
2. Proof of Theorem 4.3
To prove Theorem 4.3, we use the idea of decremental secret
key agreement [37, Theorem 4.2].
Proposition B.1 ([37, Theorem 4.2]) If ZV can be rewritten
for some ∅ 6= T ⊆ C ∈ P∗(ZV ) as
Zi =
{
(Zˆi,X) ∀i ∈ T
Zˆi ∀i ∈ V \ T,
(B.5)
where H(X) = H(X|ZˆV ) > 0, then, we have
H(Z′V ) < H(ZV ) and I(Z
′
V ) = I(ZV ) (B.6)
for some function Z′i = ϑi(Zi) for i ∈ V . ✷
Roughly speaking, when (4.12) fails for hypergraphical
sources, we can identify and reduce excess randomness in
the source without changing CS, and so omniscience is not
optimal in achieving RS.
The “if” case of Theorem 4.3 follows from Theorem 4.2
directly. To prove the “only if” part, suppose to the contrary
that
H(ZC |ZV \C) > 0 for some C ∈ P∗(ZV ).
For hypergraphical model, this means that
H(Xe′ |ZV \C) > 0 for some e′ ∈ E,
i.e., ξ(e′) ⊆ C. Thus, (B.5) holds with X := Xe′ , T := ξ(e′) ⊆
C and
Zˆi := (Xe | e ∈ E \ e′, i ∈ ξ(e)).
By Proposition B.1, we have (B.6). With R′S and R
′
CO
denoting the communication complexity and the smallest rate
of CO for the source Z′V , we have
RS
(a)
≤R′S ≤ R′CO = H(Z′V )− I(Z′V )
(b)
<H(ZV )− I(ZV ) = RCO(ZV ),
where (a) is due to the fact that processing Zi’s individually
cannot reduce the communication complexity RS; and (b) is
by (B.6). This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3.
3. Proof of Proposition 4.8
First, observe that with W = (Xe | e ∈ E∗), using
the assumption that the random variables Xe’s are mutually
independent, we have∑
C∈P∗
H(ZC |W) =
∑
C∈P∗
H(X{e∈E\E∗|ξ(e)⊆C})
= H(X{E\E∗}) = H(ZV |W)
Hence, IP∗(ZV |W) = 0, and so W is a feasible solution to
JW,P∗(ZV ). Thus, JW,P∗(ZV ) ≤ H(XE∗). By (4.9), On the
other hand, we also have, by (4.9),
JW,P∗(ZV ) ≥ H(ZV )−
∑
C∈P∗
H(ZC |ZV \C)
= H(XE)−
∑
C∈P∗
H(X{e∈E\E∗|ξ(e)⊆C})
= H(XE)−H(X{E\E∗})
= H(XE∗)
Thus, JW,P∗(ZV ) = H(XE∗) with W = (Xe | e ∈ E∗) being
an optimal solution.
APPENDIX C
PROOFS FOR SECTION V
1. Proof of Theorem 5.1
Converse proof of CS:
We first prove ‘≤’ for (5.1) by making use of the following
result that directly extends the technique of the converse proof
of [1, Theorem 2] and [2, Theorem 6].
Lemma C.1 For any B ⊆ V \D \ S, we have
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(K|F, Z˜V \S\B) ≥ H(ZB|ZV \S\B)− r(B)
with ri := lim sup
n→∞
1
n
[∑
t∈[r]
H(Fit | F˜it, Z˜D)
+H(Z˜i|Z˜D, Z˜[i−1],K,F)−H(Ui)
]
.
(C.1a)
(C.1b)
The inequality is satisfied with equality if B = V \D \ S. ✷
This completes the proof because, by the secrecy con-
straint (3.8),
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log|K| ≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(K|F, Z˜D)
= H(ZV \D\S |ZD)− r(V \D \ S)
by the equality case of (C.1a) with B = V \D \S. Moreover,
rV \D\S satisfies (5.3b) because, for any j ∈ A and B ⊆
V \D \ S \ {j}, the limit in (C.1a) is 0 by Fano’s inequality
and the recoverability constraint (3.7) as j ∈ V \S \B. (Note
that the constraints for B ∋ j are redundant.)
PROOF (LEMMA C.1) By the assumption (3.3) of the private
randomizations and the memorylessness of the private source,
H(Z˜B|Z˜V \S\B) =
∑
i∈B
H(Ui) + nH(ZB|ZV \S\B).
Alternatively, since F is determined by Z˜V \S by (3.5), we have
H(Z˜B|Z˜V \S\B) = H(F, Z˜B|Z˜V \S\B)
= H(K,F, Z˜B|Z˜V \S\B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,
−nδn
where δn :=
1
nH(K|F, Z˜V \S) goes to 0 as n → ∞ by
Fano’s inequality because K can be recovered from (F, Z˜V \S)
asymptotically by (3.7), due to the assumption S ( A that
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there must be at least one vocal active user, i.e, A∩(V \S) 6= ∅.
Expanding the last entropy term 1, by the chain rule gives
1,=
2,︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(F|Z˜V \S\B)+H(K|F,Z˜V \S\B)+
3,︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(Z˜B|K,F,Z˜V \S\B)
2,=
∑
t∈[r]
∑
i∈V \S
H(Fit|F˜it, Z˜V \S\B)
(a)
=
∑
i∈B
∑
t∈[r]
H(Fit|F˜it, Z˜V \S\B)
(b)
≤
∑
i∈B
∑
t∈[r]
H(Fit|F˜it, Z˜D)
3,=
∑
i∈B
H(Z˜i|Z˜(V \S\B)∪[i−1],K,F)
(c)
≤
∑
i∈B
H(Z˜i|Z˜D, Z˜[i−1],K,F),
where (a) is because the entropy terms for i 6∈ B are zero
by (3.5). Rearranging the terms give (C.1) with the desired
equality condition because inequalities (b) and (c) hold with
equality if B = V \D \ S. 
Characterization of RCO:
Next, we prove the characterization of RCO in (5.2). For each
j ∈ A, let
R
′(ZV \D\S |ZD∪{j}) := {rV \D\S ∈ RV \D\S |
r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZV \S\B,Zj) ∀B ⊆ V \D\S}
R
′(ZD|Zj) := {rD ∈ RD |
r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZD\B,Zj) ∀B ⊆ D}
(C.2a)
(C.2b)
(C.2c)
(C.2d)
Note that, by the standard result of independent source
coding with side information, R′(ZV \D\S |ZD∪{j}) is the
set of achievable rate tuple for encoding each components
of the source ZV \D\S independently so that they can be
recovered from the codewords given the source ZD∪{j} as
side information. The omniscience constraint (3.13b) requires
the recoverability simultaneously for all j ∈ A, and so the
achievable rate region is⋂
j∈A
R
′(ZV \D\S |ZD∪{j})
by the result of normal source network [4, Chapter 1]. ρ in
(5.3a) is the minimum sum rate over this region because (5.3b)
is composed of (C.2b) for all j ∈ A. Similarly, it can be argued
that ⋂
j∈A
R
′(ZD|Zj) ∩R(ZD)
(with R(ZD) defined in (3.15)) is the achievable rate region
for the omniscience constraint (3.13a) together with the
rate constraints (3.16). ρ¯ in (5.4a) is the minimum sum rate
over this region. Since the above two rate constraints are
separable, the total minimum sum rate is given by ρ + ρ¯,
which completes the proof.7
Achievability of CS via omniscience:
7As a side note, although the omniscience strategy here assumes non-
interactive discussion, it can be shown as in [1] that the characterization of
RCO remains unchanged even if interactive discussion is allowed.
We first argue that an optimal solution rD to (5.4a) exists, and
so the omniscience strategy is feasible. (An optimal solution
rV \D\S to (5.3a) clearly exists.) As in (C.2), let
R
′(ZD) := {rD ∈ RD | r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZD\B) ∀B ⊆ D}
which is the set of achievable rate tuples for encoding the
components of ZD independently so that they can be recovered
from the codewords (without any side-information).
Proposition C.1 ([40]) R(ZD) is the downward hull of
R(ZD) ∩R′(ZD). ✷
PROOF Since the entropy function is a normalized submodular
function [26], R(ZD) defines an extended polymatroid and
R(ZD) ∩ R′(ZD) is the base of the polymatroid [40]. The
result follows immediately from the fact that an extended
polymatroid is a downward hull of its base. 
It follows that R(ZD) ∩ R′(ZD) is non-empty since its
downward hull R(ZD) is clearly non-empty. Furthermore,
r(D) = H(ZD) ∀rD ∈ R(ZD) ∩R′(ZD),
which is the maximum and minimum possible sum rates over
R(ZD) and R
′(ZD) respectively. An optimal solution to (5.4)
exists because any rD ∈ R(ZD) ∩ R′(ZD) is a feasible
solution, i.e., for all j ∈ A and B ⊆ D,
r(B) = r(D) − r(D \B)
≥ H(ZD)−H(ZD\B) = H(ZB|ZD\B),
satisfying the constraint (5.4b).
It remains to show that the omniscience strategy achieves
CS in (3.9). Consider r
∗
V \D\S optimal to (5.3a) and any r
∗
D
optimal to (5.4a). Note that r∗D ∈ R(ZD) by (5.4a). Then,
by Proposition C.1, there exists a non-negative weight vector
δD ≥ 0 such that r∗D + δD ∈ R(ZD) ∩ R′(ZD), which is
therefore in R′(ZD). By the usual source coding results [4],
there exists (F,GD) at rate (r
∗
V \S , δD) such that
lim
n→∞
Pr(ZnD 6= φ(FD,GD)) = 0
in addition to satisfying the omniscience constraints (3.13).
Note that GD is constructed only for the purpose of proof and
will not be discussed in public (F is the public discussion as
usual). GD is the public discussion saving of our scheme (3.13)
compare to (3.19). It follows by Fano’s inequality that the l.h.s.
of the secrecy constraint (3.8) can be rewritten as
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
[log|K| −H(K|F,ZnD)]
= lim inf
n→∞
1
n
[log|K| −H(K|F,GD)] .
By [1, Lemma B.2], the r.h.s. can be made equal to 0
(satisfying (3.8)) with
lim
n→∞
1
n
log|K| ≥ H(ZV \S)− r∗(V \ S)− δ(D)
= H(ZV \D\S |ZD)−
=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
r∗(V \D \ S)
+ [H(ZD)− r∗(D)− δ(D)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
.
This achieves the r.h.s. of (5.1) as desired.
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2. Proofs of Theorem 5.2 and its Corollaries
PROOF (THEOREM 5.2) We will argue that for both the cases
(i)-(ii), a capacity achieving scheme for the new scenario is
a valid SK generation scheme for the original scenario and
hence C′S ≤ CS. In particular, if C′S = CS, then the capacity
achieving schemes for the changed scenario will be capacity
achieving for the original scenario as well, and hence RS ≤
R′S.
Case (i): Consider turning an achievability scheme in the
new scenario to that of the original scenario. To satisfy (3.5),
the discussion by the new trusted helper can be performed by
the original vocal active user. The original vocal active user
can recover the key because the new silent active user can,
and so (3.7) holds. Observe that (3.8) continues to hold as the
untrusted users remain unchanged.
Case (ii): The constraint on (3.5) becomes more stringent
with the removal of a vocal helper, while the other constraints,
namely, (3.7) and (3.8), remain unchanged. Hence, any capac-
ity achieving scheme for the new scenario continues to be an
SK generation scheme for the original one. 
PROOF (COROLLARY 5.3) Suppose C′S = CS. The proce-
dures (i) and (ii) correspond to the cases (i) and (ii) of
Theorem 5.2, and so RS ≤ R′S. Also, using (5.2) we have
R′S ≤ R′CO. Suppose (ρ, ρ¯) becomes (ρ′, ρ¯′) in the new sce-
nario. Note that, ρ¯ = ρ¯′ if the sets (A,D) remain unchanged.
We also have (5.1), that
ρ′ = ρ− [H(Z(V \D)\S |ZD)−H(Z(V ′\D)\S′ |ZD)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
β
,
by noting that A \ S′ = (V ′ \D) \ S′. Here,
β = H(ZV \S)−H(ZV ′\S′)
= H(Z(S′\S)∪(V \V ′)|ZV ′\S′) ≥ 0.
Hence, by (5.2), R′CO = ρ¯
′+ ρ′ = ρ¯+ ρ− β ≤ ρ¯+ ρ = RCO,
which completes the proof of (5.5). Furthermore, RS = RCO
happens only if β = 0, which is the same as (5.9). 
PROOF (COROLLARY 5.4) Suppose, (5.7) holds. Then, by
(5.8), every active user can recover Un. By [1, Lemma B3],
(3.8) holds for a choice of K as a function of Un of rate
H(U|ZD). Therefore, CS can be achieved without public
discussion, i.e., RS = 0. Now, if (5.9) holds in addition,
then (3.13) holds without discussion, i.e., RCO = 0. Con-
versely, suppose that (5.9) fails, i.e., for some j ∈ A,
0 < H(ZV \S |Zj) = H(ZD|Zj) + H(ZV \S\{j}\D|Zj) holds.
Then, either H(ZD|Zj) > 0, in which case ρ¯ > 0, or
H(ZV \S\{j}\D|Zj) > 0, in which case ρ > 0. In either case,
RCO > 0 by (5.2). 
3. Proof of Theorem 5.3
The idea is to process the original source ZV to Z
(q)
V
possibly with different choices of q at different times. We
will show that (5.11) ensures that secrecy in the new scenario
guarantees secrecy in the original scenario. On the other hand,
(5.12) makes sure that the capacity does not diminish.
To proceed, divide the n-block of time instances into
consecutive nq-blocks for q ∈ Q, such that∑
q∈Q
nq = n and lim
n→∞
nq
n
= PQ(q) ∀q ∈ Q, (C.3)
where, PQ(·) is the distribution of some random variable
Q taking values in a finite set Q. The source is processed
block-by-block, with the source corresponding to the q-th
block being processed to Z
(q)
V . Therefore, Z
n
V becomes ZV :=
(Z
(q)
V
nq |q ∈ Q). There exists a public discussion F at the
rate R′CO for the active users to recover ZV , which can be
argued using the strong law of large numbers and (C.3). By
Lemma B3 of [1], a key K of rate equal to the r.h.s. of (5.12)
can be recovered by the active users, which satisfies (3.8) with
ZD replaced by ZD.
To complete the proof, we show that (3.8) is still valid with
Z˜D. Recalling that Z˜D = Z
n
D, we have
1
n
H(K|F, Z˜D) = 1
n
H(K|F,ZnD)
=
1
n
[
H(K|F,ZD)− I(ZnD ∧ K|F,ZD)
]
. (C.4)
Therefore, for some δn → 0,
I(ZnD ∧ K|F,ZD) ≤ I(ZnD ∧ ZV \D,K|F,ZD)
(a)
≤ I(ZnD ∧ ZV \D|F,ZD) + nδn
(b)
≤ I(ZnD ∧ ZV \D|ZD) + nδn
=
∑
q∈Q
nqI(ZD ∧ Z(q)V \D|Z(q)D ) + nδn
(c)
=nδn. (C.5)
(a) is by Fano’s inequality because K is recoverable asymp-
totically from ZV \D given ZD. (b) is because F is determined
by ZV . (c) follows directly from the assumption (5.11) in the
theorem statement. Therefore, combining (C.4) and (C.5), we
have 1nH(K|F, Z˜D) ≥ 1nH(K|F,ZD) − δn, which combined
with (3.8) with respect to ZD gives us the desired result.
APPENDIX D
PROOFS FOR SECTION VI
1. Proof of Shearer-Type Lemma
In this section, we prove a stronger version of Proposi-
tion 6.2 below:
Lemma D.1 For any random vector (Z′U ,W
′) and λ ∈
Λ(U, 2U \ {∅, U}),
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′) ≥ max
B∈2U\{∅,U}
λ(B)I(Z′B ∧ Z′U\B|W′)
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′) ≤
∑
B∈2U\{∅,U}
λ(B)I(Z′B ∧ Z′U\B|W′)
(D.1a)
(D.1b)
which are the lower and upper bounds of the fractional parti-
tion information in terms of Shannon’s mutual information.✷
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Note that Iλ(Z
′
U |W′) = 0 implies the lower bound (D.1a) is
zero, which implies (6.7). Conversely, Iλ(Z
′
U |W′) = 0 if the
upper bound (D.1b) is zero, which is implied by (6.7).8
PROOF Without loss of generality, let U := [m] for some
integer m > 1, and assume the optimal solution to (D.1a) is
[l] for some l ∈ [m]. By definition (6.5),
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′) = H(Z′U |W′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,
−
∑
B∈2U\{∅,U}
λ(B)H(Z′B |Z′U\B,W′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2,
By the chain rule,
1,=
∑
i∈U
= 1 by (6.1)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
B∈2U\{∅,U}:
i∈B
λ(B)H(Z′i|Z′[i−1],W′)
2,=
∑
i∈B
H(Z′i|Z′[i−1]∪(U\B),W′).
Exchanging the summations in 1,, substituting both 1, and
2, back to the original expression and simplify using the
definition of mutual information, we have
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′) =
∑
B∈2U\{∅,U}
λ(B)
∑
i∈B
I(Z′i ∧ Z′U\B |Z′[i−1],W′)
(a)
≤
∑
B∈2U\{∅,U}
λ(B)
∑
i∈B
I(Z′i ∧ Z′U\B|Z′[i−1]∩B,W′)
(b)
=
∑
B∈2U\{∅,U}
λ(B)I(Z′B ∧ Z′U\B|W′)
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning does not
increase entropy, and the equality holds if [i − 1] ⊆ B; (b)
follows from chain rule expansion. This gives the desired
upper bound (D.1b). The lower bound (D.1a) follows from
the equality case when B = [l], and the fact that all the other
terms in the sum are non-negative. 
2. Proof of Lemma 6.1
Consider proving (6.8) first. By definition (6.5),
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′)− Iλ(Z′′U |W′) =
1,︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(Z′U |W′)−H(Z′′U |W′)
−
∑
B∈2U\{∅,U}
λ(B)
[
H(Z′B|Z′U\B ,W′)−H(Z′′B|Z′′U\B ,W′)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
2,
Note that by the definition of Z′′U , we have for B ∋ i that,
1,= 2,= H(Z′i|Z′U\{i},W′)−H(Z′′i |Z′U\{i},W′).
Since the value is independent of B, we have
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′)− Iλ(Z′′U |W′) = 1,− 1,
= 1 by (6.1)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
B∋i
λ(B)−
∑
B 6∋i
λ(B) 2,
= −
∑
B 6∋i
λ(B) 2,
8It also follows from Lemma D.1 that Iλ(Z
′
U
|W′) → 0 is equivalent
to ∀B ∈ supp(λ), I(Z′
B
∧ Z′
U\B
|W′) → 0, which is not covered by
Proposition 6.2 directly.
For B 6∋ i, it can be shown using standard arguments that
2,= I(Z′′i ∧ Z′B|Z′U\B\{i},W′)− I(Z′i ∧ Z′B|Z′U\B\{i},W′)
≤ I(Z′′i ∧ Z′B|Z′U\B\{i},W′,Z′i)
≤ I(Z′′i ∧ Z′U\{i}|W′,Z′i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
3,
,
the value of which is independent of B. Hence,
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′)− Iλ(Z′′U |W′) ≥ − 3,
∑
B 6∋i
λ(B)
= − 3,
[∑
B
λ(B)−
∑
B∋i
λ(B)
]
which simplifies to −δ as desired by (6.1) and the fact that
Z′′i = Y
′.
Consider proving (6.9). By definition (6.5),
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′)− Iλ(Z′U |W′,Y′)
= I(Y′ ∧ Z′U |W′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
4,
−
∑
B
λ(B) I(Y′ ∧ Z′B|Z′U\B,W′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
5,
For B 6∋ i, we have by standard techniques that
5,≤ I(Y′ ∧ Z′U\{i}|W′,Z′i),
the value of which is independent of B. Hence,∑
B 6∋i
λ(B) 5,≤ δ.
Hence, we have
Iλ(Z
′
U |W′)− Iλ(Z′U |W′,Y′) + δ ≥ 4,−
∑
B∋i
λ(B) 5,
and so it suffices to prove that the r.h.s. is at least γ. By (6.1)
again,
4,−
∑
B∋i
λ(B) 5,=
∑
B∋i
λ(B) [ 4,− 5,]
=
∑
B∋i
λ(B)I(Y′ ∧ Z′U\B|W′)
≥
∑
B∋i
λ(B) max
j∈U\B
I(Y′ ∧ Z′j|W′)
which is at least γ as desired.
3. Proof of Theorem 6.1
We will show that for any CS-achieving scheme,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(K,F|Z˜D) ≥ JW,λ(ZU |ZD) (D.2)
and so we have the desired lower bound (6.13) since
H(K,F|Z˜D) = H(F|Z˜D) +H(K|F, Z˜D) and
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(K|F, Z˜D) ≥ CS = Iλ(ZU |ZD)
by (3.8) and the assumption (6.12). To prove (D.2), we will
rely on the following fundamental property of Iλ (6.5) for
secret key agreement:
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Lemma D.2 If CS = Iλ(ZU |ZD) as in (6.12), then
lim
n→∞
1
n
Iλ(Z˜U |K,F, Z˜D) = 0 (D.3)
for any CS-achieving scheme. ✷
It follows that L = (K,F) for any CS-achieving scheme is a
feasible solution to
CW,λ := inf lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(L|Z˜D) such that
lim
n→∞
1
n
Iλ(Z˜U |L, Z˜D) = 0.
(D.4a)
(D.4b)
In other words,
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
H(K,F|Z˜D) ≥ CW,λ.
and the proof is completed by showing that:
Lemma D.3
CW,λ = JW,λ(ZU |ZD), (D.5)
which is a single-letterization of (D.4). ✷
PROOF (LEMMA D.2) We will show using the data process-
ing inequalities in Lemma 6.1 that
1
n
Iλ(Z˜U |F, Z˜D) ≤ Iλ(ZU |ZD) and (D.6a)
lim
n→∞
1
n
{
log|K| −
[
Iλ(Z˜U |F, Z˜D)− Iλ(Z˜U |K,F, Z˜D)
]}
≤ 0.
(D.6b)
Then, for any CS-achieving scheme,
lim
n→∞
1
n
[
log|K| − Iλ(Z˜U |F, Z˜D)
]
≥ 0
by (D.6a) and that the key rate is CS = Iλ(ZU |ZD) by
assumption. Applying this to (D.6b) gives ≤ in (D.3), and
the reverse inequality follows from Proposition 6.2.
We first show (D.6a). Applying (6.9) with
Z′U = Z˜U , Y
′ = Fit, and W
′ = (Z˜D, F˜it)
for i ∈ V \ S and t ∈ [r] gives
Iλ(Z˜U |Z˜D, F˜it,Fit) ≤ Iλ(Z˜U |Z˜D, F˜it), (D.7)
because γ ≥ 0 and δ = 0 in (6.9) as
I(Y′ ∧ Z′U\{i}|W′,Z′i) ≤ H(Y′|Z′i,W′)
= H(Fit|Z˜i, Z˜D, F˜it) = 0
by (3.5). Applying (D.7) repeatedly for different (i, t) yields
Iλ(Z˜U |Z˜D) ≥ Iλ(Z˜U |Z˜D,F11)
≥ Iλ(Z˜U |Z˜D,F21)
≥ . . .
≥ Iλ(Z˜U |Z˜D,F). (D.8)
On the other hand, note that for all B ⊆ U , by (3.4),
H(Z˜B|Z˜D) = H(ZnB,UB|ZnD)
= nH(ZB|ZD) +H(UB),
which gives
Iλ(Z˜U |Z˜D) = nIλ(ZU |ZD) + Iλ(UU )
for all λ ∈ Λ(U, 2U \ {∅, U}). Since Iλ(UU ) = 0 by (3.3)
that Ui’s are mutually independent, the above equation implies
Iλ(Z˜U |Z˜D) = nIλ(ZU |ZD). This together with (D.8) give the
desired (D.6a).
To show (D.6b), we again apply (6.9) but with
Z′U = Z˜U , Y
′ = K, and W′ = (Z˜D,F)
and any i ∈ A∩U , which is feasible by the assumption S ( A
that there is at least one active vocal user and U ⊇ V \D \S
from (6.12). This gives
Iλ(Z˜U |Z˜D,F) ≥ Iλ(Z˜U |K, Z˜D,F) +H(K|Z˜D,F)− nδn
(D.9)
for some δn → 0 as n→∞, because
• the term δ in (6.9) goes to 0 because
I(Y′ ∧ Z′U\{i}|Z′i,W′) ≤ H(K|Z˜i, Z˜D,F) ≤ nδ′n
(D.10)
for some δ′n → 0 as n → ∞ by (3.7) and Fano’s
inequality;
• the term γ in (6.9) can be bounded as follow:
min
B∈supp(λ):B∋i
max
j∈U\B
I(Y′ ∧ Z′j |W′)
(a)
≥min
j∈A
I(Y′ ∧ Z′j|W′)
= min
j∈A
I(K ∧ Z˜j |F, Z˜D)
= min
j∈A
[
H(K|F, Z˜D)−H(K|Z˜j,F, Z˜D)
]
(b)
≥min
j∈A
H(K|F, Z˜D)− nδ′n
where (a) is due to (U \B) ∩A 6= ∅, ∀B ∈ 2U \ {∅, U},
(b) is by (D.10) (with j in place of i).
(D.9) implies (D.6b) by (3.8) as desired. Although not essential
for the proof of the lemma here, the reverse inequality ≥ of
(D.6b) also holds more generally by the definition of Iλ:
Iλ(Z˜U |F, Z˜D)− Iλ(Z˜U |K,F, Z˜D)
= H(K|F, Z˜D)−
∑
B
λ(B)H(K|Z˜U\B ,F, Z˜D)
≤ log|K|.
Hence, (D.6b) is indeed satisfied with equality. 
PROOF (LEMMA D.3) We single-letterize CW,λ as in [32]:
H(L|Z˜D) ≥ I(ZnU ∧ L|Z˜D)
= H(ZnU |Z˜D)−H(ZnU |Z˜D, L)
=
n∑
t=1
H(ZUt|ZDt)−
n∑
t=1
H(ZUt|Zt−1U , Z˜D, L)
=
n∑
t=1
H(ZUt|ZDt)−
n∑
t=1
H(ZUt|Zt−1U , Z˜D, L,ZDt)
= nI(ZUJ ∧WJ|ZDJ) (D.11)
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where J is the usual time-sharing random variable uniformly
distributed over [n] and independent of (ZU , Z˜D, L), and
WJ := (J,Z
J−1
U , L, Z˜D).
We can also bound Iλ in the constraint (D.4b) of CW,λ:
Iλ(Z˜U |L, Z˜D) ≥ Iλ(ZnU |L, Z˜D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,
by the data processing inequality (6.8) since Zni is determined
by Z˜i. By definition (6.5)
1,= H(ZnU |L, Z˜D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2,
−
∑
B
λ(B)H(ZnB |ZnU\B , L, Z˜D)︸ ︷︷ ︸
3,
(D.12)
Using the fact that Z˜D = Z
n
D, the r.h.s. can be further expanded
as follows:
2,=
n∑
t=1
H(ZUt|Zt−1U , L,ZnD)
=
n∑
t=1
H(ZUt|Zt−1U , L,ZnD,ZDt)
= nH(ZUJ|WJ,ZDJ)
3,=
n∑
t=1
H(ZBt|Zt−1B ,ZnU\B, L,ZnD,ZDt)
≤
n∑
t=1
H(ZBt|Zt−1U ,Z{U\B}t, L,ZnD,ZDt)
= nH(ZBJ|WJ,Z{U\B}J,ZDJ)
Altogether, we have the inequality
Iλ(ZUJ|WJ,ZDJ) ≤ 1
n
Iλ(Z˜U |L, Z˜D). (D.13)
Similar to the arguments in the proof of Theorem 4.1 in
Appendix B-1, by (D.11) and (D.13), and the fact that ZUJ
has the same distribution as ZU , we have
CW,λ ≥ H(ZU |ZD)− lim
δ→0
Γ(δ) where
Γ(δ) := sup
PW|ZU∪D :
Iλ(ZU |W,ZD)≤δ
H(ZU |ZD,W). (D.14)
(In fact, the above inequality is satisfied with equality.9) Note
that
H(ZU |ZD)− Γ(0) = JW,λ(ZU |ZD) (D.15)
and so the proof is completed by showing that Γ(δ) is
continuous at δ = 0. To show this, we will prove the following
support-type lemma that extends Proposition 6.3, following
essentialy the same argument as in [32]. 
Lemma D.4 It is admissible to impose in (D.14) that
|W | ≤
{
|ZU∪D|+ 1 δ > 0
|ZU∪D| δ = 0,
(D.16)
9The reverse inequality holds by the fact Wn i.i.d. generated according to
the solution PW|ZU∪D to (D.14) is a feasible solution to (D.4).
and so sup in (D.14) can be replaced by max and Γ(δ) is
continous in δ.10 ✷
PROOF (LEMMA D.4) Pick any z′U∪D ∈ ZU∪D, and define S
as the set of all possible vectors of values for(
H(ZU |ZD,W = w), Iλ(ZU |ZD,W = w),
PZU∪D |W=w(zU∪D) | zU∪D ∈ ZU∪D \ {z′U∪D}
)
.
There is a one-to-one mapping between the choice of
PZU∪D|W=w and the choice of v(w) ∈ S, noting that
PZU∪D|W=w(z
′
U∪D) = 1−
∑
z∈ZU∪D\{z′U∪D}
PZU∪D|W=w(zU∪D).
Thus, a feasible solution to (D.14) corresponds to a choice of
a set W , a distribution PW over W , and a vector v(w) for
every w ∈W, such that∑
PW(w)v(w) = (H(ZU |ZD,W), Iλ(ZU |ZD,W),
PZU∪D |W(zU∪D) | zU∪D ∈ ZU∪D \ {z′U∪D}).
(D.17)
(D.18)
By the Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathe´odory theorem [41], it is ad-
missible to choose |W | equal to the length of v(w) plus 1, i.e.,
|ZU∪D|+ 1 as desired in (D.16) for δ ≥ 0. If δ = 0, i.e., one
requires Iλ(ZU |ZD,W) = 0, then Iλ(ZU |ZD,W = w) = 0 for
all w ∈W since Iλ is non-negative by Proposition 6.2. In other
words, the constraint is on individual choice of PZU∪D|W=w
and so we can redefine S without having Iλ(ZU |ZD,W = w)
as a component of v(w), i.e., which gives the smaller bound
in (D.16).
Suppose there is a sequence in k of choices of
(PWk , PZU∪D |Wk) that attains Γ(δ) in the limit as k → ∞
while satisfying the constraint in (D.14), i.e.,
Iλ(ZU |ZD,Wk) ≤ δ
By imposing (D.16) such thatW is finite with size independent
of k, the feasible choices of (PWk , PZU∪D |Wk) form a compact
set. Hence, there exists a subsequence {kj}∞j=1 such that
PW = lim
j→∞
PWkj and PZU∪D |W = limj→∞
PZU∪D|Wkj . (D.19)
By the continuity of entropy [4], we also have
Iλ(ZU |ZD,W) = lim
j→∞
Iλ(ZU |ZD,Wkj ), and
H(ZU |ZD,W) = lim
j→∞
H(ZU |ZD,Wkj ).
(D.20a)
(D.20b)
Note that the r.h.s. of (D.20a) is upper bounded by δ since
each term in the limit is. Furthermore, the r.h.s. of (D.20b)
attains Γ(δ) by assumption. Hence, the supremum in (D.14)
is achieved by the above choice of W, i.e., the sup in (D.14)
can be replaced by max.
Consider proving the continuity of Γ(δ). Consider any
sequence {δk}∞k=1 such that δk > δ and δk ↓ δ as k ↑ ∞.
Since Γ(δ) is non-decreasing in δ, we have
Γ(δ) ≤ lim
k→∞
Γ(δk). (D.21)
10As in [32], it is also possible to argue that Γ(δ) is non-decreasing and
concave in δ.
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Let (PWk , PZU∪D|Wk) be the optimal solution for Γ(δk). Then,
as argued previously, (PW, PZU∪D |W) exists satisfying (D.19)
and (D.20) for some subsequent {kj}∞j=1. Furthermore, the
r.h.s. of (D.20a) is equal to limk→∞ δk = δ, and so W is a
feasible solution to (D.14). The l.h.s. of (D.20b) is therefore
upper bounded by Γ(δ) and so
Γ(δ) ≥ lim
k→∞
Γ(δk),
which is satisfied with equality by (D.21), implying that Γ(δ)
is continuous in δ. 
4. Proof of Theorem 6.2
(6.15a) follows from Theorem 6.1 directly since CS =
Iλ∗(ZV ) for all λ
∗ ∈ Λ∗(A,ZV ). To show (6.15b), choose
λ∗ ∈ Λ∗(A,ZV ) such that
supp(λ∗) =
⋃
λ′∈Λ∗(A,ZV )
supp(λ′).
This is possible, for instance, by choosing λ∗ as the average of
the extreme elements in Λ∗(A,ZV ), which are the vertices of
the feasible set in (6.6), and so there are only a finite number
of them by (6.1). LetW be the optimal solution to JW,λ∗(ZV ),
and consider λ ∈ Λ(V,H) with H defined in (6.14), we then
have
JW,λ∗(ZV ) = I(ZV ∧W)
= H(ZV )−H(ZV |W)
(a)
≥H(ZV )−
∑
B∈H
λ(B)H(ZB |W)
(b)
=H(ZV )−
∑
B∈H
λ(B)H(ZB |ZV \B,W)
≥ H(ZV )−
∑
B∈H
λ(B)H(ZB |ZV \B)
which gives Iλ(ZV ) as desired by (6.5). The inequality (a) is
because of the Shearer-type Lemma [39] stated in a slightly
different form than Proposition 6.2:∑
B
λ(B)H(ZB |W) =
∑
B
λ(B)
∑
i∈B
H(Zi|Z[i−1]∩B,W)
≥
∑
B
λ(B)
∑
i∈B
H(Zi|Z[i−1],W)
=
∑
i∈V
∑
i∈B
λ(B)H(Zi|Z[i−1],W)
=
∑
i∈V
H(Zi|Z[i−1],W)
= H(ZV |W).
The equality (b) is because the definition of JW,λ∗(ZV )
requires Iλ∗(ZV |W) = 0, which by Proposition 6.2, results
in I(ZB ∧ ZV \B|W) = 0 for all B ∈ supp(λ∗), and hence,
for all B ∈ H.
5. Proofs for Section VI-D
PROOF (PROPOSITION 6.4) Applying Theorem 5.1 to the
current case S ( A = V , (5.1) becomes
CS = H(ZV \S)−RCO, (D.22)
where RCO = ρ = min
rV \S
r(V \ S) subject to the constraints
r(B) ≥ H(ZB|Z(V \S)\B) ∀B ( V \ S : B 6= ∅
r(V \ S) ≥ H(ZV \S |Zi) ∀i ∈ S,
(D.23a)
(D.23b)
where we have used a similar argument as in the proof of
Corollary 5.1 to derive (D.23a). Note also that the set of
constraints are equivalent to the those in Corollary 5.2 but
stated in a convenient form for the current proof. We proceed
to prove (6.18a) and hence assume |V \ S| = 1. Observe
that this condition renders (D.23a) obsolete and hence using
(D.22) we have CS = H(ZV \S) −maxi∈S H(ZV \S |Zi) = α
as desired.
To complete the proof of Proposition 6.4 we consider the
case when |V \ S| > 1. Again, we shall prove this in a
case by case basis. First, consider the case when (D.23b)
are redundant, and hence RCO ≥ maxi∈S H(ZV \S |Zi). Also,
observe that since RCO = min
rV \S
r(V \ S), where rV \S is
constrained by the first set of constraints in (D.23a), we
have H(ZV \S) − RCO = I(ZV \S) using Proposition 4.2.
Therefore, using (D.22), we have CS = I(ZV \S). Also,
from the fact that RCO ≥ maxi∈S H(ZV \S |Zi), we have
CS = H(ZV \S)−RCO ≤ α, and hence (6.18b) is satisfied. We
finish the proof by looking at the remaining case, i.e., when
there exists some i ∈ S such that (D.23b) is not redundant.
An immediate consequence of this is RCO = H(ZV \S |Zi)
and hence using (D.22) we have CS = α. Also, defining
R′CO = minrV \S
r(V \S), where rV \S is constrained by (D.23a),
we see that RCO ≥ R′CO. Therefore, using Proposition 4.2,
we have I(ZV \S) ≥ H(ZV \S)−RCO = CS. Hence, we have
CS = min{α, I(ZV \S)} as desired. 
PROOF (THEOREM 6.4) We first consider the case when the
conditions for (6.20a) hold. The proof is carried out by exactly
following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 4.1 with
the choice P = P∗(ZV \S). This is possible as in this case
CS = I(ZV \S) by (6.18b). Similarly, we prove the result for
the case when the conditions for (6.20b) hold, by using CS =
I(ZV \S ∧ Zi), for some i ∈ S∗, which follows from (6.18a).
For the remaining case when |V \S| > 1 and α = I(ZV \S),
we observe using (6.18b) that every i ∈ S∗ satisfies
CS = IP∗(ZV \S) = I(ZV \S ∧ Zi). (D.24)
Corollary 5.3 of [10], says that there exists some θ ∈
(0, 1) which satisfies IP(Z(V \S)∪{i}) = θIP∗(ZV \S) + (1 −
θ)I(ZV \S ∧ Zi), with P = P∗(ZV \S) ∪ {i}. Hence, using
(D.24), we have CS = IP (Z(V \S)∪{i}) for every i ∈ S∗. The
result now follows by proceeding along the same steps as in the
proof of Theorem 4.1, with the choice P = P∗(ZV \S) ∪ {i},
for any i ∈ S∗. 
PROOF (THEOREM 6.5) The proof technique is similar to the
proof of Theorem 4.2. We use the hypothesis of Theorem 6.5
to show that the lower bound to RS obtained in Theorem 6.4
evaluates to RCO. This, in conjunction with the trivial upper
bound RS ≤ RCO, gives us the result.
We first observe that the conditions in (i) imply that
JD,P∗(ZV \S) = H(ZV \S). Hence, via (6.20a) and the in-
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equality JW,P∗(ZV \S) ≥ JD,P∗(ZV \S), we have RS ≥
H(ZV \S)− I(ZV \S) = RCO.
Next we consider the case when the conditions in
(ii) hold. Therefore, there exists i ∈ S∗ satisfying
JD,{V \S,{i}}(ZV \S ,Zi) = H(ZV \S .Zi) − H(Zi|ZV \S) =
H(ZV \S). Using (D.22) and Proposition 6.4, the bound in
(6.20b) evaluates to RS ≥ RCO.
To complete the proof, we look at the scenario
described in (iii). Observe that there exists i ∈ S∗,
such that JD,P∗(ZV \S)∪{i}(Z(V \S)∪{i}) = H(ZV \S ,Zi) −∑
C∈P∗(ZV \S)
H(ZC |Z(V \S)\C ,Zi) − H(Zi|ZV \S) =
H(ZV \S). Hence, the lower bound to RS in (6.20c) evaluates
to RCO by (6.18b) and (D.22). Therefore, we have RS = RCO
as required. 
6. Proofs for Section VI-E
PROOF (PROPOSITION 6.5) Choose any vocal active user j ∈
A∩ (V \ S). Observe that by (3.7), it is admissible to choose
the secret key K = θj(Z˜j ,F) for some function θj . Assume
there is a hyperedge e′ such that ξ(e′) ⊆ S. Then, the sequence
of random variables Xne′ associated with the hyperedge e
′ is
independent of (K,F, (Xne | e ∈ E \ {e′}),UV \S). This is
because Xe′ is not observed by any vocal user, including j,
who generate K,F entirely from ((Xne | e ∈ E \ {e′}),UV \S).
Similarly, it can be argued that Xne′ does not play any part
in recovering ZnV \S , as it is independent of X
n
e′ . Therefore,
removing the hyperedge e′ does not affect CS, RS and RCO.
PROOF (THEOREM 6.6) Proposition 6.5 ensures it is enough
to prove the results for hypergraphs satisfying (6.21). Observe
that (6.22a) follows directly from (6.20a). We only need to
verify the other two scenarios.
We begin by arguing the following claim, that I(Zj ∧
Z(V \S)∪S′) = α, for all j ∈ S∗, and all S′ ⊆ S∗ \ {j}.
First, assume to the contrary that we have a strict inequality
(>) instead of an equality for some i ∈ S∗ and some
S′ ⊆ S∗ \ {i}. Then, there exists a hyperedge e′ ∈ E
that contributes to I(Zj ∧ Z(V \S)∪S′) = H(XE′), but not to
I(Zi ∧ ZV \S) = H(XE′′ ), i.e., e′ ∈ E′ \ E
′′
and E′ ⊇ E′′ .
It immediately implies that j ∈ ξ(e′) and ξ(e′) ⊆ S, which
violates (6.21). Hence, we must have I(Zj ∧Z(V \S)∪S′) = α,
for all j ∈ S∗ and all S′ ⊆ S∗ \ {j}.
Using the above claim, we proceed to prove (6.22c).
Consider any j ∈ S∗, and observe that α = I(ZV \S ∧
Zj) = IP∗(ZV \S), using the hypothesis of (6.22c). Now,
using Corollary 5.3 of [10], there exists θ ∈ (0, 1) such that
IP∗(ZV \S)∪{j}(Z(V \S)∪{j}) = θIP∗(ZV \S)+(1−θ)I(ZV \S∧
Zj) = α. We can continue with this process inductively to
show that IP∗(ZV \S)∪{{i}|i∈S∗}(Z(V \S)∪S∗) = α = CS. Using
this, one can proceed along similar steps as in the proof of
Theorem 4.1 to obtain (6.22c).
The proof of (6.22b) follows using a similar inductive
argument and we omit the details. 
PROOF (THEOREM 6.7) To begin with, we restrict our at-
tention to hypergraphs satisfying (6.21). This is because of
Proposition 6.5 and the fact that none of the entropy terms
in (i)-(iii) are affected by the removal of some hyperedge e
satisfying ξ(e) ⊆ S.
We omit the proof of the fact that RS = RCO if the
required condition from (i)-(iii) hold, by noting that the proof
follows from Theorem 6.6 by the same steps as in the proof
of Theorem 6.5. We focus on proving the fact that RS = RCO
implies that the required condition from (i)-(iii) hold. We
proceed according to a case by case basis.
Case I: |V \ S| > 1 and I(ZV \S) < α.
We assume that (i) does not hold. We will show that RS <
RCO. Then, there exists e
′ ∈ E such that ξ(e′) \ S ⊆ C, for
some C ∈ P∗(V \ S). We use the idea of decremental secret
key agreement as in [37] to reduce H(Xe′ ) by an amount
ǫ ∈ (0, α− I(ZV \S)). Whereas, this operation does not affect
I(ZV \S), we note that α changes by at most ǫ, thereby keeping
CS unaffected. However,H(ZV \S) does decrease by ǫ, and the
fact that CS remains unchanged implies that RCO reduces by
ǫ using (D.22). Thus, we must have RS being strictly less than
the RCO before the reduction by ǫ.
Case II: |V \S| = 1 or, when |V \S| > 1 and I(ZV \S) > α.
Here, we drop the case when |V \ S| = 1 as the condition
holds by default.
Again, assume (ii) does not hold. Then, there exists a
hyperedge e′ ∈ E such that ξ(e′) ⊆ (V \ S∗). We can
reduce the entropy of Xe′ by some ǫ > 0 small enough
without affecting the secrecy capacity using decremental secret
key agreement of [37]. If |V \ S| = 1, we can choose any
ǫ ∈ (0,mini∈S/S∗ I(ZV \S ∧ Zi) − α) as the reduction in
entropy will not affect the set S∗ of optimal solutions and
therefore α. In the other case |V \S| > 1 and I(ZV \S) > α, we
impose an additional constraint that ǫ < I(ZV \S) − α. Then,
α remains unaffected after the reduction in entropy, whereas
I(ZV \S) decreases by at most ǫ. Thus, CS remains unchanged.
Moreover, the fact that (6.21) holds implies H(ZV \S) reduces
by ǫ, and so does RCO using (D.22). Therefore, we must have
RS < RCO before reduction.
Case III: |V \ S| > 1 and I(ZV \S) = α
Assume (iii) is invalid and hence, there exists e′ ∈ E such
that ξ(e′) ⊆ C for some C ∈ P∗(ZV \S). We reduce the
entropy of Xe by some amount of ǫ > 0. While α remains
unaffected by the operation, the decremental secret key agree-
ment detailed in [37] ensures that choosing ǫ sufficiently small
not affect I(ZV \S) either. Thus, CS is unaffected. However,
clearly H(ZV \S) reduces by ǫ and so does RCO. Hence,
RS < RCO before reduction as required. 
APPENDIX E
PROOF FOR SECTION VII
1. Proof of Proposition 7.1
To prove the desired result, we will make use of the
following independence relation satisfied by the private source:
0 = I(Z1 ∧ Z2) = I(Z3 ∧ Z{1,2,4}) = I(Z3 ∧ Z{1,2,5}). (E.1)
The desired conclusion will be proved by showing the stronger
result that
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
[
H(F{4,5})− 3H(K)
] ≥ 0 (E.2)
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which implies RS ≥ 3CS = 3 = RCO as desired.
To prove the above, define
at : = I(Z˜1 ∧ Z˜2|FtV )− I(Z˜1 ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V )
bt : = I(Z˜3 ∧ Z˜{1,2,4}|FtV )− I(Z˜3 ∧ Z˜{1,2,4}|Ft−1V )
ct : = I(Z˜3 ∧ Z˜{1,2,5}|FtV )− I(Z˜3 ∧ Z˜{1,2,5}|Ft−1V )
(E.3a)
(E.3b)
(E.3c)
By definition of (E.3), we have
r∑
t=1
(at + bt + ct)
= I(Z˜1 ∧ Z˜2|F) + I(Z˜3 ∧ Z˜{1,2,4}|F) + I(Z˜3 ∧ Z˜{1,2,5}|F)
≥ 3H(K)− 3nδn
for some δn → 0 as n → ∞. Here, the inequality follows
from the recoverability (3.7) and secrecy (3.8) requirement,
for instance, I(Z˜1 ∧ Z˜2|F) ≥ I(Z˜1,K ∧ Z˜2,K|F) − nδn2 ≥
H(K)− nδn. Then, it suffices to show that
H(F{4,5}) ≥
r∑
t=1
(at + bt + ct). (E.4)
To achieve this, we will bound at, bt and ct one by one. We
first bound at as follows:
at
(a)
= I(FV t ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V , Z˜1)− I(FV t ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V )
(b)
= I(FV t ∧ Z˜{1,2}|Ft−1V )− I(FV t ∧ Z˜1|Ft−1V )
− I(FV t ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V )
(c)
= I(F{1,2}t ∧ Z˜{1,2}|Ft−1V )
+ I(F{3,4,5}t ∧ Z˜{1,2}|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
− I(FV t ∧ Z˜1|Ft−1V )− I(FV t ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V )
(d)
=H(F{1,2}t|Ft−1V ) + I(F{3,4,5}t ∧ Z˜{1,2}|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
− I(FV t ∧ Z˜1|Ft−1V )− I(FV t ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V )
(e)
≤ I(F{3,4,5}t ∧ Z˜{1,2}|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
where (a) is due to the fact that
I(Z˜1,FV t ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V )
= I(Z˜1 ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V ) + I(FV t ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V , Z˜1)
= I(FV t ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V ) + I(Z˜1 ∧ Z˜2|FtV ),
(b) and (c) are due to the chain rule expansion, (d) is due to
the fact that
I(F{1,2}t ∧ Z˜{1,2}|Ft−1V ) = H(F{1,2}t|Ft−1V )
by (3.5), (e) is due to the fact that
I(FV t ∧ Z˜1|Ft−1V ) + I(FV t ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V )
≥ I(F1t ∧ Z˜1|Ft−1V ) + I(F{1,2}t ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V )
≥ I(F1t ∧ Z˜1|Ft−1V ) + I(F2t ∧ Z˜2|Ft−1V ,F1t)
= H(F1t|Ft−1V ) +H(F2t|Ft−1V ,F1t)
= H(F{1,2}t|Ft−1V )
We then bound bt as follows:
bt
(a)
= I(FV t ∧ Z˜{1,2,4}|Ft−1V , Z˜3)− I(FV t ∧ Z˜{1,2,4}|Ft−1V )
(b)
= I(FV t ∧ Z˜{1,2,3,4}|Ft−1V )− I(FV t ∧ Z˜3|Ft−1V )
− I(FV t ∧ Z˜{1,2,4}|Ft−1V )
(c)
≤H(FV t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2,4})− I(FV t ∧ Z˜3|Ft−1V )
(d)
=H(F3t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2,4},F{1,2}t)
+H(F4t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2,4},F{1,2,3}t)
+H(F5t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2,4},F{1,2,3,4}t)− I(FV t ∧ Z˜3|Ft−1V )
(e)
=H(F3t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2,4},F{1,2}t)
+H(F5t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2,4},F{1,2,3,4}t)− I(FV t ∧ Z˜3|Ft−1V )
(f)
≤H(F3t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2},F{1,2}t)
+H(F5t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2},F{1,2,3,4}t)− I(FV t ∧ Z˜3|Ft−1V )
(g)
≤H(F3t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2},F{1,2}t)
+H(F5t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2},F{1,2,3,4}t)−H(F3t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
where (a) is due to the fact that
I(Z˜3,FV t ∧ Z˜{1,2,4}|Ft−1V )
= I(Z˜3 ∧ Z˜{1,2,4}|Ft−1V ) + I(FV t ∧ Z˜{1,2,4}|Ft−1V , Z˜3)
= I(FV t ∧ Z˜{1,2,4}|Ft−1V ) + I(Z˜3 ∧ Z˜{1,2,4}|FtV ),
(b) is due to the chain rule expansion, (c) is due to the fact
that
I(FV t ∧ Z˜{1,2,3,4}|Ft−1V ) ≤ H(FV t|Ft−1V ),
(d) is due to the chain rule expansion and the fact that
H(F{1,2}t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2,4}) = 0
by (3.5), Similarly, (e) follows from (3.5) that
H(F4t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2,4},F{1,2,3}t) = 0
(f) follows from the fact that conditioning cannot increase
entropy, (g) is because
I(FV t ∧ Z˜3|Ft−1V ) ≥ I(F{1,2,3}t ∧ Z˜3|Ft−1V )
≥ I(F3t ∧ Z˜3|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
= H(F3t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
by (3.5).
Following similar steps as above, ct is also upper bounded
by
ct ≤ H(F{3,4}t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2,5},F{1,2}t)
+H(F5t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2,5},F{1,2,3,4}t)
−H(F3t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
≤ H(F{3,4}t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2},F{1,2}t)−H(F3t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
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Therefore, we have at + bt + ct
≤ I(F{3,4,5}t ∧ Z˜{1,2}|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
+H(F3t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2},F{1,2}t)
+H(F5t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2},F{1,2,3,4}t)
+H(F{3,4}t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2},F{1,2}t)− 2H(F3t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
(a)
≤H(F{3,4,5}t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)−H(F3t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
= H(F{4,5}t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2,3}t)
where (a) is because
I(F{3,4,5}t∧Z˜{1,2}|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
= H(F{3,4,5}t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t)
−H(F{3,4,5}t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t, Z˜{1,2}),
H(F3t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2},F{1,2}t) ≤ H(F3t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t),
H(F{3,4,5}t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2}t, Z˜{1,2})
= H(F5t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2},F{1,2,3,4}t)
+H(F{3,4}t|Ft−1V , Z˜{1,2},F{1,2}t)
Finally,
H(F{4,5}) =
r∑
t=1
H(F{4,5}t|Ft−1{4,5})
≥
r∑
t=1
H(F{4,5}t|Ft−1V ,F{1,2,3}t)
≥
r∑
t=1
(at + bt + ct),
which completes the proof.
2. Proofs of Theorems 7.1 and 7.2
PROOF (THEOREM 7.1) We prove the cases one by one:
(i) We first show that an achieving scheme for the original
scenario is an achieving scheme for the new scenario.
To satisfy (3.5), the discussion by the original vocal
untrusted user i can be done by the new vocal trusted
helper i′. (3.7) and (3.8) still hold because there is no
change to (A,D). Hence, CS does not decrease and RS
does not increase.
To prove the reverse inequalities, consider an achieving
scheme for the new scenario. By Proposition 3.1, it
suffices to show that the scheme can be applied to the
original scenario, with private randomization allowed for
the untrusted user. To satisfy (3.5), the discussion and
private randomization by the new user i′ can be done by
the original vocal untrusted user. (3.7) and (3.8) continue
to hold trivially.
(ii) Similar to the above case, the vocal user j can play the
role of the removed trusted helper i in terms of private
randomization and public discussion, and so (3.5) can be
satisfied. (3.7) and (3.8) remain unchanged since (A,D)
remains unchanged. 
PROOF (THEOREM 7.2) It suffices to show that an achieving
scheme for the original scenario can be applied to the new
scenario.
(i) (3.5) continues to hold as the set V \ S of vocal users
remains unchanged. (3.7) and (3.8) also hold as they can
only be less stringent with (A,D) diminished.
(ii) (3.5) continues to hold because the set V \ S of vocal
users becomes larger.(3.7) and (3.8) remain unchanged
trivially. 
REFERENCES
[1] I. Csisza´r and P. Narayan, “Secrecy capacities for multiple terminals,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 50, no. 12, pp. 3047–3061, Dec. 2004.
[2] A. Gohari and V. Anantharam, “Information-theoretic key agreement of
multiple terminals—Part I,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 56, no. 8, pp.
3973 –3996, Aug. 2010.
[3] H. Tyagi, “Common information and secret key capacity,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 59, no. 9, pp. 5627–5640, Sep. 2013.
[4] I. Csiszar and J. Ko¨rner, Information Theory: Coding Theorems for
Discrete Memoryless Systems, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press,
2011.
[5] M. Mukherjee, N. Kashyap, and Y. Sankarasubramaniam, “On the public
communication needed to achieve SK capacity in the multiterminal
source model,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 3811–3830,
Jul. 2016.
[6] C. Chan and L. Zheng, “Mutual dependence for secret key agreement,”
in Proc. 44th Annu. Conf. Inf. Sci. Syst. (CISS), Princeton, NJ, USA,
Mar. 2010, pp. 1–6.
[7] T. A. Courtade and T. R. Halford, “Coded cooperative data exchange for
a secret key,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 3785–3795,
Jul. 2016.
[8] M. Mukherjee, N. Kashyap, and Y. Sankarasubramaniam, “Achieving
SK capacity in the source model: When must all terminals talk?” in
Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT), Honolulu, HI, USA, Jun./Jul.
2014, pp. 1156–1160.
[9] H. Zhang, Y. Liang, and L. Lai, “Secret key capacity: Talk or keep
silent?” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT), Hong Kong, Jun.
2015, pp. 291–295.
[10] C. Chan, A. Al-Bashabsheh, J. Ebrahimi, T. Kaced, and T. Liu, “Mul-
tivariate mutual information inspired by secret-key agreement,” Proc.
IEEE, vol. 103, no. 10, pp. 1883–1913, Oct. 2015.
[11] C. Chan, A. Al-Bashabsheh, J. B. Ebrahimi, T. Kaced, S. Kadhe, T. Liu,
A. Sprintson, M. Yan, and Q. Zhou, “Successive omniscience,” in Proc.
Int. Symp. Netw. Coding (NetCod), Sydney, NSW, Australia, Jun. 2015.
[12] C. Chan, A. Al-Bashabsheh, Q. Zhou, N. Ding, T. Liu, and A. Sprintson,
“Successive omniscience,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 6, pp.
3270–3289, Jun. 2016.
[13] C. Chan, “Generating secret in a network,” Ph.D. dissertation, Dept.
Elect. Eng. Comput. Sci., Massachusetts Inst. Technol., Cambridge, MA,
USA, 2010.
[14] M. Mukherjee and N. Kashyap, “The communication complexity of
achieving SK capacity in a class of PIN models,” in Proc. IEEE Int.
Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT), Hong Kong, Jun. 2015, pp. 296–300.
[15] S. Nitinawarat, C. Ye, A. Barg, P. Narayan, and A. Reznik, “Secret key
generation for a pairwise independent network model,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. 56, no. 12, pp. 6482–6489, Dec. 2010.
[16] S. Nitinawarat and P. Narayan, “Perfect omniscience, perfect secrecy,
and Steiner tree packing,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 56, no. 12, pp.
6490–6500, Dec. 2010.
[17] C. Chan, M. Mukherjee, N. Kashyap, and Q. Zhou, “When is omni-
science a rate-optimal strategy for achieving secret key capacity?” in
Proc. IEEE Inf. Theory Workshop (ITW), Cambridge, U.K., Sep. 2016,
pp. 354–358.
[18] R. Ahlswede and I. Csisza´r, “Common randomness in information theory
and cryptography—Part I: Secret sharing,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1121–1132, Jul. 1993.
[19] U. M. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common
information,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 733–742, May.
1993.
[20] M. Mukherjee, C. Chan, N. Kashyap, and Q. Zhou, “Bounds on the
communication rate needed to achieve SK capacity in the hypergraphical
source model,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT), Barcelona,
Spain, Jul. 2016, pp. 2504–2508.
28
[21] I. Csisza´r and P. Narayan, “Common randomness and secret key
generation with a helper,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 46, no. 2, pp.
344–366, Mar. 2000.
[22] P. Ga´cs and J. Ko¨rner, “Common information is far less than mutual
information,” Probl. Control Inf. Theory, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 149–162,
Feb. 1972.
[23] C. Chan, “The hidden flow of information,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp.
Inf. Theory (ISIT), St. Petersburg, Russia, Jul./Aug. 2011, pp. 978–982.
[24] N. Milosavljevic, S. Pawar, S. E. Rouayheb, M. Gastpar, and K. Ram-
chandran, “Deterministic algorithm for the cooperative data exchange
problem,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT), St. Petersburg,
Russia, Jul./Aug. 2011, pp. 410–414.
[25] C. Chan, “On tightness of mutual dependence upperbound for secret-
key capacity of multiple terminals,” CoRR, vol. abs/0805.3200, 2008.
[Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/0805.3200
[26] S. Fujishige, “Polymatroidal dependence structure of a set of random
variables,” Inf. Control, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 55–72, 1978.
[27] R. W. Yeung, “A new outlook on Shannon’s information measures,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 466–474, May 1991.
[28] ——, Information Theory and Network Coding. New York, NY, USA:
Springer, 2008.
[29] C. Chan and T. Liu, “Clustering by multivariate mutual information
under chow-liu tree approximation,” in Proc. 53rd Annu. Allerton Conf.
Commun., Control, Comput. (Allerton), Monticello, IL, USA, Sep. 2015,
pp. 993–999.
[30] C. Chan, A. Al-Bashabsheh, Q. Zhou, T. Kaced, and T. Liu, “Info-
clustering: A mathematical theory for data clustering,” IEEE Trans.
Molecular, Biol., Multi-Scale Commun., vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 64–91, Jun.
2016.
[31] C. Chan, A. Al-Bashabsheh, Q. Zhou, and T. Liu, “Duality between
feature selection and data clustering,” in Proc. 54th Annu. Allerton Conf.
Commun., Control, Comput. (Allerton), Monticello, IL, USA, Sep. 2016,
pp. 142–147.
[32] A. Wyner, “The common information of two dependent random vari-
ables,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 163–179, Mar. 1975.
[33] W. Liu, G. Xu, and B. Chen, “The common information of N dependent
random variables,” in Proc. 48th Annu. Allerton Conf. Commun., Con-
trol, Comput. (Allerton), Monticello, IL, USA, Sep. 2010, pp. 836–843.
[34] T. S. Han, “Linear dependence structure of the entropy space,” Inf.
Control, vol. 29, pp. 337–368, 1975.
[35] Q. Chen, F. Cheng, T. Liu, and R. W. Yeung, “A marginal characteriza-
tion of entropy functions for conditional mutually independent random
variables (with application to wyner’s common information),” in Proc.
IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT), Hong Kong, Jun. 2015, pp. 974–978.
[36] C. Chan, M. Mukherjee, N. Kashyap, and Q. Zhou, “Secret key
agreement under discussion rate constraints,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp.
Inf. Theory (ISIT), Aachen, Germany, Jun. 2017, pp. 1519–1523.
[37] C. Chan, A. Al-Bashabsheh, and Q. Zhou, “Incremental and decremental
secret key agreement,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT),
Barcelona, Spain, Jul. 2016, pp. 2514–2518.
[38] I. Csisza´r and P. Narayan, “Secrecy capacities for multiterminal channel
models,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2437–2452, Jun.
2008.
[39] M. Madiman and P. Tetali, “Information inequalities for joint distribu-
tions, with interpretations and applications,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 56, no. 6, pp. 2699–2713, Jun. 2010.
[40] A. Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization: Polyhedra and Efficiency.
New York, NY, USA: Springer, 2002.
[41] H. G. Eggleston, Convexity. CUP Archive, 1958, no. 47.
